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Crotty: The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for Fourth Amendment Change

Notes
THE AERIAL DRAGNET: A DRONE-ING NEED
FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT CHANGE
"There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment."1
I. INTRODUCTION
After a stressful day of work, Tom walks out of the front door of his
home, gets into his vehicle, and heads off to the casino.2 The next day,
Tom visits an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting after his appointment with
a psychiatrist. On any given day or span of days, Tom could visit a liquor
store, funeral home, sexually transmitted disease clinic, casino,
psychiatrist, strip club, take his significant other to an abortion clinic, or
travel to the home of his troubled brother. Tom’s brother has a heavy drug
problem and Tom contacts him on a daily basis to help provide moral
support with the hope that his brother will become clean. Unknown to
Tom or anyone in his family, his brother has recently become involved in
the large-scale production of illegal drugs. A law enforcement agency has
placed Tom under investigation based solely on the phone calls that occur
between Tom and his brother.
The law enforcement agency, excited about its new unmanned aerial
vehicle (“drone”) program, begins to covertly follow Tom’s every
movement while he travels on public thoroughfares.3 These drones are
capable of following Tom’s vehicle for lengthy periods of time and
cataloging his movements.4 Over an extended period of time, the drones
have accumulated a vast amount of information about Tom’s lifestyle by
tracking his movements. The frightening part about Tom’s situation is
that a law enforcement agency does not need to obtain a warrant to
monitor Tom’s vehicle with drones.5 In fact, constant monitoring of Tom
is perfectly legal so long as the monitoring occurs on public
thoroughfares.6
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, 4 (1949).
This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author to illustrate the issues
presented in this Note.
3
See infra Part II.A (summarizing the abilities of the drone technology that is currently
available on the market).
4
See infra Part II.A (discussing the technological capabilities of drones).
5
See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine).
6
See infra Part II.C.2 (reviewing the lack of privacy protection afforded to vehicles
traveling on public thoroughfares).
1
2
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Most people would agree that briefly monitoring an individual is not
overly intrusive, such as a police officer following an individual’s vehicle.7
This type of monitoring is necessary for a law enforcement agency to
perform its duties and has become an understood part of society.8
However, most people would not believe or expect that a law enforcement
agency would follow or track a person’s every movement for extended
periods of time.9 Current drone technology allows for continuous
monitoring over extended periods of time with little or no chance of
discovery by the person being monitored.10 An agency violates an
individual’s freedom from unreasonable searches when this warrantless
monitoring occurs, and a line must be drawn as to when that violation
occurs.11
The current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that confronts
unreasonable searches allows for the free, unlimited, and warrantless
monitoring of people while they travel on public thoroughfares.12
Although people have no expectation of privacy while traveling on public
thoroughfares, new technology in the form of drones makes this
monitoring easier and more cost-effective for law enforcement agencies
than ever before.13 A fleet of drones can monitor, record, and track large
groups of citizens’ movements on public thoroughfares and intrude into
the lives of Americans in a way that has never been possible.14 This type
of intrusive monitoring threatens the constitutional guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment.15
To resolve this potential threat, this Note embraces a judiciallyenforced standard of reasonableness when it comes to warrantless longterm monitoring of individuals while on public thoroughfares.16 This
Note proposes that courts consider a number of different factors in
See infra note 161 and accompanying text (referencing some examples of what the public
considers to be a normal monitoring).
8
See infra note 85 and accompanying text (describing the following of vehicles on public
roads as a traditional form of surveillance).
9
See infra note 116 and accompanying text (detailing Justice Alito’s concurring opinions
in United States v. Jones).
10
See infra Part II.A (discussing the capabilities of drone technology).
11
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and arguing that
long-term drone monitoring is a constitutional violation).
12
See infra Part II.C.2 (providing the relevant jurisprudential evolution that has led to this
principle).
13
See infra Part III.B–C (analyzing the current reasonable expectation of privacy
framework and the failing to provide a remedy in light of current drone capabilities).
14
See infra Part II.A (presenting the current capabilities of drone technology).
15
See infra Part III.C (arguing that drone technology needs to be reined in to provide
individuals protection from law enforcement agencies).
16
See infra Part IV (proposing a modern approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine).
7
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determining first, what is reasonable in terms of length; and second, when
an investigation must either end or a law enforcement agency must apply
for a warrant.17 This solution provides guidelines in an attempt to place
limits on the currently unfettered discretion of law enforcement agencies
regarding the use of drones monitoring public thoroughfares.18
Part II of this Note begins by presenting some of the capabilities of
current drone technology and provides the relevant Fourth Amendment
search jurisprudence.19 Next, Part III of this Note analyzes why the
current Fourth Amendment framework does not require law enforcement
agencies to exercise restraint when using drones to monitor individuals
traveling on public thoroughfares.20 Finally, Part IV of this Note endorses
a new judicial framework that will limit the amount of time a drone may
monitor an individual without a warrant by evaluating the potential
amount of information that can be gained from the investigation and the
underlying reason the investigation was initiated.21
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment provides individuals with the right to be free
from unreasonable searches by the government.22 The Amendment
codified the sacred common law right to be secure in one’s own person,
free from arbitrary and oppressive government intrusion.23 The Fourth
17
See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the new framework that is
proposed by this Note to combat the potential for long-term drone surveillance operations).
18
See infra Part IV (presenting and evaluating the framework of the modern privacy
expectation doctrine).
19
See infra Part II (discussing the history of drones and their current capabilities and the
two Fourth Amendment doctrines that have developed over the last century).
20
See infra Part III (evaluating the failure of the trespass-based doctrine and the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine in the context of drone surveillance of individuals traveling
on public thoroughfares).
21
See infra Part IV (proposing a new framework and evaluating its benefits in a world of
increasing drone usage).
22
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
23
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (describing the First, Second,
and Fourth Amendments as codified versions of a pre-existing common law right); United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s aim to protect
liberty and privacy from arbitrary governmental intrusion); United States v. Terry, 392 U.S.
1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
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Amendment is interpreted in light of contemporary standards and
norms.24 A Fourth Amendment search occurs when an individual’s
property rights have been violated or when an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy has been violated.25 A search that violates either of
these principles will be upheld as legal if a warrant is sought prior
thereto.26 These safeguards are in place to prevent abuses by law
(quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))); District of Columbia v.
Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (describing the codification of the Fourth Amendment
as an existing right “already belonging to the people”). The Fourth Amendment holds the
home of individuals to be the area where the most amount of protection is afforded. Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). The Court in Johnson stated:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home
is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.
Id. at 14.
24
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980) (describing the evolution of the
Fourth Amendment based on changes in societal norms). The Supreme Court “has not
simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time
of the Fourth Amendment’s passage.” Id.
25
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (summarizing the existence of two
different formulations that lead to a Fourth Amendment violation); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (determining a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the
reasonable expectation of an individual’s privacy was intruded upon during a warrantless
surveillance operation); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding the
violation of an individual’s property rights as the determinative factor in Fourth
Amendment issues), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
106 (1967); Brittany Boatman, Comment, United States v. Jones: The Foolish Revival of the
"Trespass Doctrine" in Addressing GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 47 VAL. U. L. REV.
677, 687–88 (2013) (suggesting that the Supreme Court, moving forward, will have difficulty
in determining what standard to apply).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (describing judicial oversight and the
warrant requirement as critical in protecting individuals from government intrusion). “The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is, wherever practical, to involve a judicial officer (not
directly charged with the duty to investigate or prosecute) in the decision to search any
constitutionally protected area.” United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4, 8 (6th Cir. 1975).
However, “[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for
effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14–15. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) for some examples of these
“exceptional circumstances” setting aside the warrant requirement, including the plain view
exception; Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (presenting the consent
exception); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (creating the automobile
exception); Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedure Survey, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1257, 1266–72
(2004) (outlining an extensive discussion of the exceptions to the warrant requirement at the
Supreme Court, federal, and state level).
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enforcement agencies.27 First, Part II.A of this Note discusses the
capabilities of drones.28 Part II.B addresses the traditional Fourth
Amendment test, the trespass-based doctrine.29 Next, Part II.C describes
the more modern reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine.30 Finally,
Part II.D highlights the most recent Fourth Amendment Supreme Court
case, which revived the defunct trespass-based doctrine.31 Drones have
been around for almost a century now; however, only recently have they
developed into sophisticated technological machines that act as an
effective law enforcement tool.32
A. Drone Capabilities
A drone is an aircraft that does not have a pilot onboard and is capable
of flying by remote control or autonomously.33 Drones have an extensive

27
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (describing the central concern of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals from having their homes and personal effects
from being intruded upon by law enforcement agencies); Berger, 388 U.S. at 53 (discussing
the purpose as safeguarding the privacy of individuals and keeping citizens free from
arbitrary invasions by the government). Some of the original controversies that resulted in
the enactment of the Fourth Amendment include English housebreaking laws—searches of
homes done without the requisite probable cause or justification. See David E. Steinberg, The
Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1063–69
(2004) (summarizing these original controversies in light of the framers’ intent to prevent
unreasonable searches).
28
See infra Part II.A (presenting the current capabilities of drone technology and some
potential advances on the horizon in the drone industry).
29
See infra Part II.B (discussing early Fourth Amendment cases and the strict reliance
which necessitated a physical trespass before finding a constitutional violation).
30
See infra Part II.C (describing the transformation to the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine and discussing a few specific contexts to which it has been applied).
31
See infra Part II.D (detailing the re-emergence of the trespass-based approach in United
States v. Jones, which some believed to have been extinct).
32
See infra Part II.A (outlining the technological sophistication of drones and their
application for domestic law enforcement operations).
33
See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 331 (2012)
(providing the definition of an unmanned aerial vehicle and also cross referencing it as a
drone or remotely piloted vehicle). Drones can be piloted in a number of different ways. See
John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 465–66 (2013) (referencing some drones which are piloted remotely by
the pilot, who must remain in visual contact with the drone, while others relay images from
onboard cameras to the pilot to allow them to operate at greater ranges). Autonomous and
semiautonomous flight can also be obtained through the use of a global positioning system
(“GPS”). Id. at 466. Drones are also capable of being piloted from applications that can be
downloaded to an iPhone, iPad, or Android technology. See Apps, PARROT AR.DRONE2.0,
http://ardrone2.parrot.com/apps/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/8QLM-PL9L (demonstrating the emergence of drone technology into the
civilian market by simplifying the process to operate these drones). For purposes of this
Note, the term “drone” will be used interchangeably to mean an unmanned aerial vehicle,
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history of military use and the United States operates them prominently
in many different conflicts abroad, including the War on Terror.34 Several
domestic law enforcement agencies have recently acknowledged the
implementation of drones into their investigative repertoire.35 These
acknowledgements have led to a number of different legislative efforts, at
both the state and federal level, to curb law enforcement’s use of drones.36
unmanned aircraft system, remotely piloted vehicle, remotely operated aircraft, and other
potential synonyms for an aircraft that operates without an onboard pilot.
34
See BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42718, PILOTLESS DRONES: BACKGROUND AND
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 1 (2012) (discussing the beginning of the use of drones for
military use which dates back as early as World War I). The report goes on to discuss the
growing popularity of drone usage in the 1980s and 1990s for missions in the Balkan
Peninsula, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Id. United States drone usage has received heavy criticism
and publicity from the international community regarding the targeted killings of terrorists
in the War on Terror. See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted
Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 414–22 (2009) (analyzing the legality of these
targeted killings under international humanitarian law and chastising the United States’ use
of drones in such actions).
35
See Brian Bennett, FBI Has Been Using Drones Since 2006, Watchdog Agency Says, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-usingdrones-2006-20130926,0,3270950.story#axzz2xlB06oDp, archived at http://perma.cc/7CP2TD6B (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has been using drones
domestically since 2006). Drone usage has been growing steadily with law enforcement
agencies. See Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases New Drone List-Is Your Town on the Map? (Feb. 27,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/faa-releases-new-list-drone-authorizations2013),
your-local-law-enforcement-agency-map, archived at http://perma.cc/BN9F-XKJB (providing
a detailed map of what governmental agencies have applied for drone usage permits and
where they have been granted). The growth in domestic drone usage was spurred in part
by the passage of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) Modernization and Reform
Act. See ELIAS, supra note 34, at 5 (outlining the goals of the FAA’s Modernization and
Reform Act and the potential difficulty that will arise during the task). This Act strives to
have unmanned aircrafts effectively integrated into our air airspace by 2015. Id. The phrase
“law enforcement agency” and “law enforcement agent” will be used in this Note to simplify
this matter and not get bogged down in the details of what agency was involved. Several
different government agencies and departments will be replaced by the phrase “law
enforcement agency” in this Note, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and most notably state and local
law enforcement agencies across the country.
36
See Preserving American Privacy Act, H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing a
probable cause requirement before the use of drones in law enforcement investigations);
Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, S. 3287, 112th Cong. (2012)
(detailing a similar standard on the drone usage and having a requirement that a warrant be
sought before drone usage); RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701,
DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 18–20 (2013) (summarizing the current congressional efforts to pass
drone privacy legislation). For some examples of successfully passed state legislation, see
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21–213 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (prohibiting the use of drones for
surveillance and evidence gathering absent a warrant). The Commonwealth of Virginia
passed a moratorium on the usage of unmanned aircrafts until July of 2015. 2013 Va. Acts
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The traditional function of drone technology has been to perform
reconnaissance and surveillance operations for the military.37 Advanced
technology allows drones to perform a variety of tasks beyond traditional
intelligence gathering operations.38 These advances have made drones
appealing to members of the private sector as well as government
organizations.39 However, domestic law enforcement agencies are
turning to drone technology to more effectively perform their
investigative duties, primarily using them to perform surveillance
operations.40
755. For a scholarly view of the legislation that has been proposed, see Chris Schlag, The New
Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and
Privacy Rights, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 17–20 (2013) (discussing both the attempts at
the federal level more generally and also mentioning some of the successes that states have
had). The author believes the legislation that has been passed or is trying to be passed does
not fully address the privacy concerns that are at hand. Id. at 20. The author ultimately
believes that the protection afforded to consumers would best be served by having Congress
enact legislation that pertains to both private citizens and governmental entities that operate
drones. Id. at 21–22. A website for criminal defense lawyers keeps an up to date detailed
map of what legislative actions each state has made regarding drone usage. See DDIC Bill
Map, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/
domesticdrones/billmap (last visited Mar. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ED36QZ8Z (presenting an interactive map of drone legislation in the United States); Jonathan
Hafetz, Redefining State Power and Individual Rights in the War on Terrorism, 46 VAL. U. L. REV.
843, 856 (2012) (insinuating the United States’s adoption of the use of drones in deadly
attacks is a controversial practice).
37
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 3–4 (outlining some of the surveillance technology
that can be equipped on drones to increase their capabilities); JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 4 (2012) (describing the
traditional functions of drones as being for “[i]ntelligence, [s]urveillance, and
[r]econnaissance”).
Although the traditional function has been surveillance and
reconnaissance operations, the lethal arming of drones in the War on Terror is what has led
to their prominence in the public arena today. THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 2.
38
See generally MICRODRONES.COM, http://www.microdrones.com/en/home (last
visited Jan. 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QT4N-Z5WG (summarizing an extensive
list of operations that can be performed by the md4-200 and md4-1000 drone). The list has a
large number of both traditional and non-traditional surveillance operations, including
traffic accident monitoring, wildlife tracking, real estate photography, environmental
monitoring, fire scene inspection, and wind turbine inspection, among many others. Id.
39
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 11 (discussing efforts made by commercial entities to
perform tasks more effectively). Google has begun using drones to obtain and build map
data while also developing street-based views. Id. Some media agencies have also begun
the implication of drones to collect private information. Id. Amazon.com, the online retailer,
has announced that it is currently planning to introduce a delivery program that will allow
lightweight packages to be delivered to the customer’s door via a drone. Amazon Prime Air,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/4KKT-U5NX. Amazon optimistically believes that it could be ready to
use this system as early as 2015. Id.
40
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 3 (describing a number of different governmental
entities that are using drones to perform a wide variety of surveillance operations). The
Department of Homeland Security uses drones to monitor the borders for unlawful entry.
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The current drones being produced have a great amount of variation
among their specifications and capabilities.41 Size is one of the most
drastic variations that exist among drones.42 Some drones are full-sized
aircrafts while others more closely resemble sophisticated model planes.43
Id. The report identifies that over 300 local law enforcement agencies have applied to use
domestic drones in their operations. Id. at 3 n.18. The report identifies the first arrest that
was made by a local law enforcement agency with the assistance of a drone, which took place
in North Dakota in June of 2011. Id. at 3; see Mark Brunswick, Spies in the Sky Signal New Age
(July
22,
2012,
6:26
AM),
available
at
of
Surveillance,
STARTRIBUNE
http://www.startribune.com/local/163304886.html?refer=y, archived at http://perma.cc/
8LSC-A4BL (providing the facts of the arrest in North Dakota and the concerns that this type
of law enforcement activity raises). Drones are more cost effective than manned aircrafts,
which is just one reason why law enforcement agencies are turning to drone technology.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 13–37,
INTERIM REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 7 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter DOJ DRONE AUDIT], available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/a1337.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N59GBVQK. But see Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional,
Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law
Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 684 (2009) (explaining the barriers that law enforcement
agencies have in implementing drones into their investigations). Under the current FAA
regulations, a law enforcement agency must apply for a certificate of authorization before
operating a drone. Id. at 686. However, the FAA is currently determining what to do with
drone regulations and so this major barrier may hinge on the new policies drafted. Id. at 689.
41
See Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in
Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 629 (2009) (comparing the
capabilities of Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk with AeroVironment’s RQ-11B
Raven); see also JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT, ACLU 2–3
(2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/Z5NF-GZS9 (describing the variation among large fixed wing
drone aircrafts and the smaller more mobile versions that are in production).
42
See GERTLER, supra note 37, at 31–32 (displaying graphic representations of some of the
drones’ sizes that the military is currently operating today). The smallest drone represented
in this report, the Shadow, has a length of eleven feet and a wingspan of fourteen feet. Id.
By comparison the two largest drones, the Global Hawk and the BAMS, operate at a length
of forty-eight feet and have a wingspan of 131 feet. Id. There are also much smaller drones
in operations. See Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
72, 85 (2013) (describing advances in technology and the miniaturization of electronics that
have led to these new drones); infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (presenting details
regarding the variation that exists among some of the drones currently in production).
43
See U.S. Air Force, Factsheet: MQ-1B Predator, http://www.af.mil/AboustUS/
FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx (last visited Jan. 15,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VPR9-RCAD (providing the specifications of the MQ-1B
Predator which has a wingspan of fifty-five feet and a length of twenty-seven feet). The
Predator is truly an amazing machine that is capable of operating in the air for a period of
twenty-four hours while being operated remotely by a two-man crew. Id. In August of 2011,
the Predator surpassed one million hours in use by the United States Air Force. Id. There
are several much smaller drones currently on the market, including the md4-200, Parrot
AR.Drone2.0, and Wasp III. See Technical Data, MD4-200 Specifications, MICRODRONES,
http://www.microdrones.com/en/products/md4-200/technical-data/ (last visited Oct.
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The larger drones take off from a traditional runway, but many of the
smaller drones are capable of being launched by a catapult or even from
the hands of an operator.44 Drones are also capable of staying airborne for
long periods of time, several in excess of twenty-four hours.45 Drones can
operate at all altitude ranges.46
14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/R4PY-JGPJ (presenting the specifications for the md4200 which is less than two feet across and one foot tall); Technical Specifications State of the Art
Technology, PARROT AR.DRONE2.0, http://ardrone2.parrot.com/ardrone-2/specifications/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X8YR-Z3UQ (outlining the
specifications of the AR.Drone2.0, which also is less than two feet in length and width); Wasp
III Technical Specifications, AEROVIRONMENT, http://www.avinc.com/downloads/
Wasp_III.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6V66-Y6UE (providing
the technical specifications of the Wasp III which has a wingspan just over two feet and a
length just over one foot). While these drones are some of the smallest available on the
market, companies are experimenting with even smaller drone technology. See STANLEY &
CRUMP, supra note 41, at 3 (discussing the experimental Nano Hummingbird, which has a
wingspan of six and a half inches and weighs less than a single AA battery).
44
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-511, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE SAFETY AND EXPAND THEIR POTENTIAL USES WITHIN
THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 7–8 (2008) [hereinafter GAO SAFETY] (contrasting several
different drone launching mechanisms). The Predator B, RQ-4A, and Fire Scout all take off
in a traditional fashion from a runway or helipad. Id. at 8. The Aerosonde and the ScanEagle
are launched using a catapult system. Id. Additionally, the Aerosonde is capable of being
launched from the roof of a fast moving vehicle. Id. The SkySeer weighs in at only four
pounds and is capable of being launched by the operator from the ground. Id. All of these
drones are classified as having both military and civil application, the only exception being
the Fire Scout, which is limited to military application at this time. Id.; see David J. R. Frakt,
Direct Participation in Hostilities As A War Crime: America's Failed Efforts to Change the Law of
War, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 751 (2012) (suggesting that the operators of drones could be
considered war criminals for the actions of the drones).
45
See GERTLER, supra note 37, at 31 (discussing the capabilities of seven different drones
currently in use by the Department of Defense). Some of the drones with shorter endurance
spans, the Shadow and Fire Scout, are capable of flying for around six hours. Id. However,
the Predator, Grey Eagle, Reaper, and Global Hawk offer flight times in excess of twentyfour hours. Id. One proposed plan by Boeing Company aims to achieve four days of
endurance. Phantom Eye: Overview, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/bds/
phantom_works/phantom_eye.page (last visited Jan. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/85GD-RU7T. Many of the smaller drones have substantially shorter
endurance in the air. See, e.g., AEROVIRONMENT, supra note 43 (discussing the Wasp III’s
ability to remain airborne for approximately forty-five minutes); MICRODRONES, supra note
43 (presenting the flight time of the md4-200, which only operates for thirty-five minutes).
46
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE
INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 4–6 (2012) [hereinafter GAO PRIVACY
CONCERNS] (discussing the different ranges of altitudes as categorized by the FAA and
applying some of the current drone technology to these classifications). Many small drones
operate at several hundred feet above ground level, which this report classifies as effective
for crime scene surveillance, wildfire tracking, and search and rescue operations. Id. at 6.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense operate drones at a
higher altitude for military training and border surveillance. Id. NASA flies the highest
altitude drone operations occurring above 60,000 feet. Id.; see also McBride, supra note 41, at
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Drones are also equipped with a number of different technologies to
further their abilities.47 Some of these technologies include motion sensing
technology, advanced cameras, thermal cameras, x-ray technology, and
night-vision.48 Distributed video technology—the use of several drones
equipped with cameras operating in a coordinated effort—potentially
allows for a dragnet of surveillance covering an area as large as an entire
city.49 The capabilities of drones and the technology they are equipped
with make them effective law enforcement tools.50 The increased interest
629 (contrasting the altitudes of the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the RQ-11B Raven, which
respectively operate below 65,000 feet and 500 feet); AEROVIRONMENT, supra note 43
(presenting the operational altitude of the Wasp III, which flies between fifty feet and 1000
feet).
47
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 3–4 (presenting some of the technology that can be
equipped on drones). Some of the technology includes features like advanced cameras,
license plate readers, and laser radar. Id. at 3. The report also goes on to mention the
possibility that other advanced technologies may be equipped on drones such as facial
recognition software or soft biometric recognition technology. Id. at 4.
48
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 7–8 (discussing motion sensing technology, advanced
cameras, infrared sensors, and other technology); Phillip J. Hiltner, Comment, The Drones are
Coming: Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Police Surveillance and Its Fourth Amendment
Implications, 3 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 397, 399–400 (2013) (arguing drones’ potential ability to
create an Orwellian society because of the technology they are equipped with, including
possibilities such as “[h]igh powered zoom lenses; facial recognition, infrared, and night
vision cameras; WiFi sniffers; see-through imaging; and automatic license plate readers”).
One particular camera that is already equipped on some drones is capable of monitoring a
target sixty-five square miles away from 20,000 feet in the air. See US Army Unveils 1.8
Gigapixel Camera Helicopter Drone, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011, 6:11 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16358851, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ5V8MD6. This camera is capable of simultaneously tracking sixty-five different independently
moving targets. Id.
49
See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 41, at 6 (discussing a new program, Gorgon Stare,
being developed by the Air Force and considered for domestic applications). The Gorgon
Stare program allows a fleet of drones over a city to monitor and track the movements of
large groups of individuals simultaneously. Id. This technology is also referred to as swarm
technology because it is inspired by the concerted efforts of insects. See Darren Quick, Boeing
Demonstrates Swarm Technology, GIZMAG.COM (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.gizmag.com/
uav-swarm-technology/19581/, archived at http://perma.cc/KFM8-N8AY (referring to a
successful test of this technology as a “milestone in UAV flight”).
50
See DOJ DRONE AUDIT, supra note 40, at 3 (discussing the preferential treatment drones
are getting based on their low operation costs compared to traditional aerial surveillance
operations). This report identifies the cost differential of drones, at $25 per hour, to manned
aircraft surveillance, at $650 per hour. Id. The report continues, “[c]onsidering the low
operational cost of [drones] compared to manned aircraft, privacy advocates have expressed
concern that non-emergency [drone] use could quickly transform into routine or broader
evidence-gathering activities.” Id. at 7. This report identifies the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States
Marshals Service as having drones. Id. at 5–6. A recent freedom of information request, filed
by the Citizens for Ethics and Responsibility in Washington, revealed the FBI’s PowerPoint
presentation covering the internal guidelines for warrantless drone surveillance operations.
Shawn Musgrave, Revealed: The FBI's Internal Guidelines for Warrantless Drone Surveillance,
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in drones will continue to stimulate drone manufacturers to streamline
Drone technology presents an entirely new
their capabilities.51
investigative technique for domestic law enforcement agencies across the
country, and the Fourth Amendment implications are endless.52
B. The Trespass-based Approach
Early Fourth Amendment decisions determined whether a violation
occurred by using a trespass-based approach.53 In Olmstead v. United
MOTHERBOARD, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/revealed-the-fbis-internal-guidelinesfor-warrantless-drone-surveillance
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/M3YT-HJJA. This internal presentation provides the precedential reasons
as to why law enforcement agencies should be able to continue using drones in their
investigations. Id.
51
See GLENNON J. HARRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42938, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS (UAS): MANUFACTURING TRENDS 1–2 (2013) (exemplifying the growing drone
production that is forecasted in the coming years which is currently largely stimulated by
the Department of Defense); GAO SAFETY, supra note 44, at 3 (discussing the forecasted
increase in drone production and usage over the next decade). Several drone manufacturers,
including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrup Grumman, are already in the process of
streamlining their drones. See GERTLER, supra note 37, at 47–48 (detailing the efforts of these
companies to create effective new drones). Some of the goals are to create easily portable
drones and longer endurance systems. Id. at 46, 49.
52
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 1–2 (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications
of advancing technology). “Courts have long grappled with how to apply the text [of the
Fourth Amendment] to 20th century technologies.” Id. at 2. The report argues that the
constitutional implications of drone surveillance will ultimately be determined by whether
the surveillance takes place “at home, in [the] backyard, in the public square, or near a
national border.” Id. at 12. The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has argued that
governmental drone surveillance needs to be regulated based on the amount of information
that can be gained from long-term monitoring. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 41, at 1;
CHRISTOPHER CALABRESE, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, ACLU, ORAL STATEMENT AT THE FIELD
FORUM ON DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (Oct. 25, 2012). The ACLU
urges strict regulation by placing a probable cause requirement on drone usage by law
enforcement. STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 41, at 15. Further regulation is also suggested
in the form of public notice of drone usage and auditing of the drones’ effectiveness. Id. at
16. In 2012, the University of Monmouth performed a survey of the public inquiring their
potential concerns about domestic drone usage by law enforcement agencies. See U.S.
Supports Some Domestic Drone Use: But Public Registers Concern About Own Privacy,
MONMOUTH UNIV. POLLING INST. 1, 4 (June 12, 2012) [hereinafter MONMOUTH POLLING
INSTITUTE], available at http://www.monmouth.edu, archived at http://perma.cc/XY3PTSEX (explaining the survey that was performed and the results that were returned from the
more than 1700 people polled). This survey inquired about the amount of knowledge the
public generally had regarding drones. Id. The survey further inquired whether the
individuals supported or opposed the use of drones for several different types of domestic
law enforcement operations. Id. at 1–2. The survey elicited whether domestic drones should
be used to: issue speeding tickets, control illegal immigration, perform search and rescue
operations, and track down runaway criminals. Id. at 2–3.
53
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the use of the detectaphone was not a Fourth Amendment

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 13

230

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

States, a law enforcement agency used a wire-tapping device to listen in
on conversations discussing illegal bootlegging of liquor during the
prohibition-era.54 The wire-tapping device was inserted on the telephone
wires outside of several conspirators’ residences and a central office.55 The
Court held the Fourth Amendment was not violated because no physical
intrusion of the home or curtilage occurred during the wire-tapping.56 In
violation); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S.
at 353 and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 106 (1967) (holding that the use of wire-tapping
was not a Fourth Amendment violation because no physical intrusion of the home or
curtilage occurred). The trespass-based approach is based on a literal interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 316 (1998) (arguing the Fourth
Amendment interpretation under the trespass-based doctrine only applied to physical
intrusions of constitutionally protected areas). This article goes on to discuss the evisceration
of the trespass doctrine by Katz and the cases following it. Id. at 328–30. But see Orin S. Kerr,
The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 68 (arguing the
characterization of the trespass-based approach is a mistake). Orin S. Kerr, a leading Fourth
Amendment scholar, argues that the cases actually focused on physical penetration into a
protected area, but that the Court did not emphasize the trespass. Id. at 68–69.
54
277 U.S. at 456–57. The conspiracy to import and sell liquor manufactured in Canada
was of some magnitude and involved the employment of more than fifty people, two seagoing vessels, and several properties with large storage caches. Id. at 455–56. The aggregate
sales amounted to more than two million dollars per year. Id. at 456. The law enforcement
agency’s only evidence of guilt was acquired by these surreptitiously overheard
conversations. Id. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55
Id. at 457. Discussing the application of the wire-tapping to the telephone wires, the
Court stated, “[t]he language of the [A]mendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office.
The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways
along which they are stretched.” Id. at 465. The law enforcement agency used these listening
devices to overhear conversations, both incoming and outgoing, relating to this criminal
enterprise for several months. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457. The wire-tapping of the main
headquarters took place in the basement of the business complex and not outside on the
streets, as occurred at the residences. Id. However, the Court refused to differentiate on
these grounds because the headquarters was a communal property and the conspirators did
not have any property interest in the basement. Id.
56
Id. at 466. The Court in Olmstead relied heavily on Weeks v. United States in coming to
the conclusion that a search did not occur here. Id. at 460. The Court described Weeks as
“perhaps the most important” in a line of precedential cases that it considered. Id. Weeks
involved an arrest of an individual who was involved in a lottery scam. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914). The arrest was made after law enforcement agents went to
Weeks’s home while he was at work and without a warrant entered, searched, and took
possession of documents. Id. The Court ultimately held that the taking of these documents
by a law enforcement agent without a warrant was a violation of Weeks’s constitutional
rights. Id. at 398. The outcome of Weeks was restated as, “the sweeping declaration that the
Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in court, really
forbade its introduction if obtained by the government officers through a violation of the
Amendment.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462. The Court in Olmstead also discussed several other
early Fourth Amendment cases to reach their conclusion. Id. at 458–465; see, e.g., Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30–31 (1925) (rejecting the argument made by the government that
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dissent, Justice Brandeis argued the physical location of the wiretapping
device was irrelevant because the individual’s privacy was invaded; thus,
a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.57
The trespass-based approach was reaffirmed almost fifteen years later
in Goldman v. United States.58 Goldman involved law enforcement’s use of
a detectaphone, a device that amplified noises on the other side of a
partitioned wall by grounding the apparatus to the wall.59 Law
enforcement agents gained access to an adjoining office of the conspirators
and used this device to listen in on a meeting that discussed an illegal
bankruptcy scheme.60 The Court held no violation of the Fourth
a warrantless search was after arrest and permissible when Agnello’s residence was several
blocks away from where the arrest took place); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315–16
(1921) (finding the warrantless search of an individual’s home and storage area within his
curtilage, which turned up illegal liquor, as impermissible and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (striking down a statute that
required the production of documents because the statute’s language amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure).
57
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475–76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the wire-tapping
done here violated the privacy of the individuals’ whose conversations were overheard and
similarly violated the Fourth Amendment). The dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis noted
that the location of the physical contact is immaterial to the Fourth Amendment discussion.
Id. at 479. Justice Brandeis believed that the majority placed far too much emphasis on the
literal constriction of the Fourth Amendment and not enough on the rights of the individuals’
whose privacy was intruded upon. Id. at 476. Justice Brandeis’s crusade for the protection
of individual’s privacy continued:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478. Scholar Thomas Clancy has argued that the type of intrusion that occurs here is
merely a modern version of what the framers of the Constitution intended to protect against
in the enactment of the Fourth Amendment. See Thomas K. Clancy, What is a “Search” Within
the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2006) (detailing Justice
Brandeis’s dissenting argument).
58
316 U.S. at 135.
59
Id. at 131–32. The detectaphone is described by the Court as “having a receiver so
delicate as, when placed against the partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating in
[the adjoining room].” Id. at 131.
60
Id. at 131–32. Law enforcement agents trespassed into the conspirator’s office the night
before this meeting took place and installed a listening device; however, this device failed
the following day and only then was the detectaphone used. Id. at 131. Petitioners asserted
the use of the detectaphone was a continuance of the trespass and, as such, should still be
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Amendment occurred by using the detectaphone, which did not cause a
trespass or unlawful entry to occur, when the device heard the
conversations going on through the wall.61 The dissenting opinion urged
the Court to apply a less stringent Fourth Amendment test because the use
of the detectaphone violated the individuals’ privacy.62 The dissenting
opinions in Olmstead and Goldman forecasted the inevitable departure
from the rigid trespass-based approach.63
considered an unreasonable search. Id. at 134–35. The Court agreed with both lower courts
that determined the original trespass did not materially aid the use of the detectaphone and,
as such, treated the events as though they were completely unrelated. Goldman, 316 U.S. at
135.
61
Id. The Court made apparent that no meaningful distinction could be drawn between
using a phone in one’s office and having a conversation with individuals and, as such,
refused to differentiate this case from Olmstead. Id. at 135. The law enforcement agency’s
next logical argument, that Olmstead needs to be overruled, was similarly refused by the
Court, which further supported the endorsement of the trespass-based approach. Id.
However, two justices would have embraced this opportunity to overturn Olmstead, which
was used as the underlying justification for this case. Id. at 136 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
62
See id. at 136–37 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Brandeis’s dissenting
opinion as memorable). Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion, which echoes Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, argued that the circumstances surrounding this search
constituted an invasion of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Goldman,
316 U.S. at 136–37. Justice Murphy concedes that no coverage would be afforded to these
individuals under a literal construction of the Fourth Amendment because no physical
search occurred, no entry occurred, and no files were ransacked. Id. at 138. Murphy’s dissent
urges a departure from the literal construction of the Fourth Amendment by stating:
The conditions of modern life have greatly expanded the range and
character of those activities which require protection from intrusive
action by Government officials if men and women are to enjoy the full
benefit of that privacy which the Fourth Amendment was intended to
provide. It is our duty to see that this historic provision receives a
construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the needs
and manners of each succeeding generation.
Id. at 138. Justice Murphy continued his argument by determining that the framers of the
Constitution would detest these new technologies that allow for invasion of privacy without
physical intrusion. Id. at 139. “Surely the spirit motivating the framers of that Amendment
would abhor these new devices no less. Physical entry may be wholly immaterial.” Id.
63
See supra notes 57, 62 and accompanying text (providing the dissenting opinions of
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead and Justice Murphy in Goldman). This departure was also
forecasted in the Silverman v. United States decision. 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). Silverman
involved the use of a “spike mike” by law enforcement agents, which was inserted through
an adjoining wall and contacted a heating duct of Silverman’s residence. Id. The Court
determined the touching that occurred here violated the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 512. However, Justice Douglas’s interpretation of this case in light of the
precedent is as follows:
My trouble with stare decisis in this field is that it leads us to a matching
of cases on irrelevant facts. An electronic device on the outside wall of
a house is a permissible invasion of privacy according to Goldman v.
United States, while an electronic device that penetrates the wall, as
here, is not. Yet the invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the
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C. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine
Advances in technology made it possible for law enforcement
agencies to monitor people’s actions, without trespassing, in places where
one would normally expect privacy.64 The trespass-based framework
failed to provide protection against these new technologies.65 First, Part
II.C.1 discusses the landmark decision Katz v. United States, which created
the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine.66 Next, Part II.C.2
addresses the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy

other. The concept of ‘an unauthorized physical penetration into the
premises,’ on which the present decision rests seems to me to be beside
the point. Was not the wrong in both cases done when the intimacies of
the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed? The depth of the
penetration of the electronic device—even the degree of its remoteness
from the inside of the house—is not the measure of the injury.
Id. at 512–13 (emphasis in original) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice
Douglas desired to emphasize the protection of privacy and not the physical trespass. Id. at
513.
64
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (holding that the use of the
detectaphone was not a Fourth Amendment violation); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (holding that the use of wire-tapping was not a Fourth Amendment violation
because no physical intrusion of the home or curtilage occurred). Justice Brandeis addressed
this concept by stating:
‘[T]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting), for a similar discussion of the dangers presented by the advent of new nonintrusive technology such as the detectaphone, technology that was available for use in the
1940s and capable of searching an individual’s home or office without causing a physical
intrusion to occur. Justice Murphy stated, “science has brought forth far more effective
devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy” and furthers his argument for the illegality of
this search by stating, “[i]t is not the breaking of his . . . doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence–those are but ‘circumstances of
aggravation.’” Id. at 139 n.6 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
65
See Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy, and Advancing Technology, 80
MISS. L.J. 1131, 1138 (2011) (discussing the departure from the trespass-based approach
because its application was during a time period when surveillance technology was
relatively crude and simplistic). The advancing technology available to law enforcement
agencies created a debate between the Justices of the Supreme Court. Id. at 1139. The concern
was whether the Court should adhere to a historical approach that governed the Fourth
Amendment for nearly a century and a half or if new technology required a different
approach. Id.
66
See infra Part II.C.1 (detailing the momentous decision which changed the landscape of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence forever, placing special emphasis on the two-pronged
analysis adopted by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion).
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doctrine to the context of vehicles traveling on public thoroughfares.67
Finally, Part II.C.3 focuses on the application of the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine to aerial surveillance operations.68
1.

Katz v. United States: Justice Harlan Champions a New Approach to
the Fourth Amendment

In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed a non-intrusive
eavesdropping technology and dramatically altered the landscape of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.69 Katz involved a listening device
attached to the exterior of a phone booth, which was capable of hearing
conversations within the booth.70 This listening device overheard
conversations by Katz transmitting wagering information in violation of a
federal statute.71 The Court stated the issue as whether or not the
attachment of this listening device violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment
rights when the device was placed on the exterior and never penetrated
the phone booth.72 The majority opinion held the warrantless search that
67
See infra Part II.C.2 (summarizing the reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence
as applied to vehicles traveling on public thoroughfares).
68
See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the application of Justice Harlan’s two-pronged analysis
to aerial surveillance techniques that law enforcement agencies have used).
69
389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). The importance of Katz was described by famous Fourth
Amendment scholar, Anthony Amsterdam, as a “watershed in [F]ourth [A]mendment
jurisprudence.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 382 (1974). The real value of Katz was the articulation of the reasonable expectation
of privacy formulation, which succinctly stated the legal standard the Court had been
applying. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 820 (2004) (evaluating the statements made by
Justice Harlan in Katz and the formulation of the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine).
See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009), for some discussion on the dramatic effect of Katz, including
the historical context around the decision and lasting effect of the case. The reasonable
expectation of privacy test “extends beyond the confines of the Constitution; it has found its
way into common law and statutes, and even the laws of other countries.” Id.
70
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. The Ninth Circuit Appellate decision sheds more light on the
actual procedure that the law enforcement agents used with the listening device. Katz v.
United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). The agents taped a microphone wired to a
recorder on top of two different phone booths and listened to Katz’s conversations for a
period of seven days. Id. The Appellate Court, relying on Goldman and Olmstead, ultimately
held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred here because no physical penetration
occurred when these microphones were placed on the exterior of the phone booth. Id. at 134.
71
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. The federal statute, still in use today, makes it a crime for a person
to place bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest using a wire communication across
state lines. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006). Records obtained from the phone company showed that
Katz was relaying information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. Katz, 369 F.2d at 132.
72
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. The Court discarded the formulation of the issue presented by the
Petitioner because it placed far too much emphasis on the “constitutionally protected area,”
which the Court did not deem relevant to the discussion. Id. at 350–51. The Court believed
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took place did not comply with constitutional standards and overturned
Katz’s conviction even though no physical trespass occurred.73 The Court
held the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and wholly
discarded the requirement that a physical trespass occur for a search to
take place.74
The truly lasting effect of Katz is seen in Justice Harlan’s concurrence,
which articulated a two-pronged test that gave rise to a flexible Fourth
Amendment analysis capable of adapting to changing technology.75 The
this formulation created too heavy of an emphasis on the characterization of the telephone
booth, from which the calls were placed. Id. at 351.
73
Id. at 359. The Court rejected the law enforcement agency’s claim that it acted in an
entirely defensible manner by waiting until it had a strong possibility that Katz was involved
in illegal gambling, and limiting the listening device to only overhear the conversation in
which Katz was involved. Id. at 354. The Court was of the opinion that the law enforcement
agency conducted a search and should have applied for a warrant before doing so. Id. at
354–55. The law enforcement agency also argued that since they relied on previous Supreme
Court decisions Goldman and Olmstead that their actions should be seen as valid, which the
Court quickly rejected. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356–57.
74
Id. at 351. The Court showed its concern for the protection of people by stating that the
law enforcement agency’s actions “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied.”
Id. at 353. The majority similarly concluded the “underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass' doctrine there
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.” Id. Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion described the physical trespass requirement in Goldman as “in the present day, bad
physics as well as bad law.” Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
75
Id. at 361. Justice Harlan opened by succinctly summarizing the holding of the majority
as:
[H]old[ing] only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where,
like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a
constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has
long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search
warrant.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (internal citations omitted). Justice Harlan reasserted the Court’s
ideological view of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of people rather than places before
asserting the new two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. Id. at 361. Justice
Harlan’s new formulation is described as:
[P]rovid[ing] something more; something that trespass, restricted to
traditional rights of property, could not do by itself. By explicitly basing
the protections of the Fourth Amendment on a right of privacy, the test
gave courts more flexibility to protect a broader concept of human
dignity at a time when information technology had outstripped what
property rights alone could protect.
Winn, supra note 69, at 9. For some time there appeared to be confusion as to where this twopronged reasonable expectation of privacy test came from because the lower courts and trial
briefs had no record of it. Id. Winn goes on to credit a young attorney, Harvey Schneider,
with formulating this test during his opening arguments and Justice Harlan with being
receptive to the new formulation. Id. at 12. Since Katz, Justice Harlan’s concurrence has
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first prong of the test requires a person have a subjective expectation of
privacy.76 The second prong mandates society be willing to find the
expectation reasonable.77 Justice Harlan applied this two-pronged test
and determined that, when Katz entered the phone booth, shut the door
behind him, and paid the fee to use the phone, he maintained an
expectation of privacy, and society would find his expectation
reasonable.78 Justice Harlan’s expectation of privacy formulation has a
wide reaching effect and has been used in many different contexts to

received enormous support and is a rare case where a concurrence effectively replaced a
majority opinion. Id. at 7; see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (discussing
the deviation from the property-based approach and the application of Harlan’s concurrence
in the latter half of the twentieth century); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)
(defining Justice Harlan’s concurrence as “oft-quoted”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97
(1998) (stating that the Katz test has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the formula
the Court was applying was created by Justice Harlan’s concurrence). But see Jim Harper,
Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2008) (describing
Justice Harlan’s concurrence as “[a]mend[ing] the Katz [r]ule, [b]adly”). Harper argues that
Justice Harlan’s concurrence scrambled the words of the majority and created a “murky twopart analysis.” Id.
76
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan described objects, activities,
or statements that an individual exposes to plain view will not be protected under this
subjective element. Id. However, some have argued that this element has little value because
criminals are often found to subjectively believe they have privacy. See California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (finding that the parties did not subjectively expect
their trash bags to be searched once placed on the curb for pick up); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (arguing the clear intent and manifestation of the respondent using
a ten-foot-high fence surrounding his property to maintain his privacy in his back yard while
he was involved in “unlawful agricultural pursuits”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
189 n.9 (1984) (stating the Court would not challenge the subjective expectation of one’s
privacy on their own property). Unfortunately, this prong has been contorted in many cases
and courts have failed to focus on the actual subjective expectation of the individual. See
Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is Made of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 781, 792 (2008) (detailing situations where courts have focused on precautionary
measures individuals took).
77
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan opined, “conversations in
the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.” Id. The judiciary has often emphasized
the second prong of the inquiry much more than the first prong. See Renee McDonald
Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409,
429 (2007) (critiquing the Court’s focus on the objective prong rather than the subjective).
78
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan was not persuaded by the notion
that the phone booth is open to the public and instead found that each occupant may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy while using a phone booth. Id. His concurrence actually
likens an enclosed telephone booth as an area “like a home.” Id. at 360. Justice Harlan noted
interception of a conversation that was reasonably intended to be private could constitute a
search. Id. at 361–62 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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determine when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.79 Several
cases applied Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine
to the context of vehicles traveling on public thoroughfares.80
2.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine Does Not Provide
Protection for Vehicles Traveling on Public Thoroughfares

The Supreme Court has a long history of treating vehicles differently
than homes and offices because of the purpose and very nature of a
vehicle.81 This line of logic has evolved into the principle that society does
not accept a person maintains an expectation of privacy while traveling in
a vehicle on a public thoroughfare.82 United States v. Knotts involved the
79
See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (holding that an individual does not have an expectation
of privacy in garbage bags placed on the curb of their home); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.
334, 341 (2000) (discussing a reasonable expectation of privacy in baggage a bus passenger
carried on, which was violated when a law enforcement officer squeezed the bag to
determine the contents); Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45 (determining that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists when using a phone because the information is being
voluntarily turned over to a third party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976)
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual’s bank records); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (discussing the lack of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a hotel room when the individual who was renting the room voluntarily invited
an undercover law enforcement officer inside); United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 677 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a tent is more akin to a house than a vehicle and as such a person can
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in one); United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634
(8th Cir. 1984) (finding no violation of privacy when a law enforcement officer visually
observed a storage unit from an area accessible to all tenants in the communal building);
United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1376, 1385–86 (D. Me. 1981) (equating a beach to an
open field where no reasonable expectation of privacy will be granted).
80
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the beeper cases involving the tracking of vehicles on
public thoroughfares).
81
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (stating one’s privacy
expectations are different when traveling in a vehicle as compared to the privacy expected
in a home); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1975) (arguing the circumstances that are
surrounding the search of a vehicle and the search of a home are one primary justification
for disparate treatment); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (stating this differential
treatment exists because of the “exigent circumstances that exist in connection with movable
vehicles”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell J., concurring)
(describing one reason for the disparate treatment is the difference in the intrusiveness
between a search of a home and a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925)
(discussing the need to treat vehicles differently than homes because of their mobile nature
and the ability of drivers to leave the jurisdiction or remove potential evidence from a
vehicle).
82
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–14 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
281–82 (1983). A similar line of logic is followed in cases involving open fields because
society does not find an expectation of privacy reasonable when the area is openly visible.
See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986) (holding aerial
photographs taken of a 2000 acre chemical company are considered more akin to an open
field and thus no warrant was required); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)
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use of a beeper, which was placed in a five-gallon container of chloroform
and then tracked to a location where methamphetamine was produced.83
Using information obtained from the beeper, as well as three days of
visual surveillance, law enforcement tracked the location of the container
to a cabin and eventually obtained a warrant to search the premises.84 In
justifying the use of the beeper to track the vehicle, the Court stated “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”85 The Court reasoned the beeper was simply a more effective
way of tracking what was already made available to public observation.86
(finding an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy from intrusion of warrantless
inspection of open fields).
83
460 U.S. at 277. Knotts involved a trio of individuals, Knotts, Petschen, and Armstrong.
Id. at 277–78. Law enforcement agents were originally tipped off when Armstrong was fired
from 3M Company for stealing chemicals that could be used to produce illegal narcotics. Id.
at 278. Law enforcement received permission from Hawkins Chemical Company to install
the beeper before the sale of the chemicals. Id. Surprisingly, the installation of the beeper by
the chemical company was not challenged in the case based on Knotts’ belief that he did not
have standing to challenge such an installation. Id. at 279 n.**. Justice Brennan was not
persuaded by the lower court’s decision, which disposed of the installation issue on the
grounds that Hawkins Chemical Company consented. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279. Law enforcement agents were able to track the container from
Minneapolis, Minnesota to Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Id. at 277. At one point during the
investigation law enforcement refrained from visual surveillance because the driver of the
vehicle began to make evasive maneuvers. Id. at 278. With the assistance of a helicopter and
the beeper tracking device law enforcement officers picked up the signal again
approximately one hour later. Id. The Court noted that the beeper was not used after the
location of the cabin was determined. Id. at 278–79. Upon executing the search warrant the
law enforcement agents found a fully operable drug lab, formulas for methamphetamine
and amphetamine, large quantities of chemicals, and the five-gallon container of chloroform.
Id. at 279.
85
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. The Court argued that “[t]he governmental surveillance
conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an
automobile on public streets and highways.” Id. Elaborating on the lack of an expectation
of privacy while traveling on public roads, the Court said:
When Petschen travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed
to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public
roads onto private property.
Id. at 281–82. Knotts had a normal and respectable expectation of privacy at his cabin;
however, no such expectation is extended to the vehicle that has been followed by law
enforcement to the premises. Id. at 282.
86
Id. at 284. The Court argued that visual surveillance from public places along the public
thoroughfare could have accomplished the same function as the beeper did. Id. at 282. Citing
United States v. Lee, the Court stated that nothing prevents the police from “augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. Knotts argued that this holding presents
grave danger in authorizing twenty-four hour warrantless surveillance of individuals. Id. at
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Relying on this language, the Supreme Court held no search occurred
because the individual did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
when the vehicle carrying chloroform was tracked along public
thoroughfares.87
The following year the Supreme Court discussed a similar beeper
tracking case in United States v. Karo.88 Karo involved a law enforcement
agency that obtained permission to place a tracker inside a fifty-gallon
container of ether, which was later sold to a defendant.89 Law enforcement
agents followed the container in a truck to a defendant’s residence and
then determined the container was still inside the home by turning the
beeper on once the truck departed.90 The Court determined the activation
and monitoring of the beeper while inside the residence violated
justifiable privacy rights of the individuals in the residence.91 However,
283. The Court retorted, “the reality hardly suggests [the] abuse, if such a dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id.
at 283–84 (citation omitted). See Hutchins, supra note 77, at 435–36 (discussing the treatment
that the Court gives in Knotts equating this technology to other sense augmenting technology
cases). “With regard to this class of technology, the Court finds its warrantless use
constitutionally unremarkable provided law enforcement's unaided observation under the
same circumstances would be unobjectionable.” Id. at 436.
87
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
88
468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984). The opinion begins by stating the intent of the Court is to clarify
two issues left unresolved by Knotts. Id.
89
Id. at 708. The ether was to be used to extract cocaine from clothing that had been
imported into the United States. Id. The Appellate Court held that Karo’s Fourth
Amendment rights were violated during the acquisition of the container of ether from the
government informant. United States. v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir. 1983), rev’d 468
U.S. 705 (1984). The Appellate Court stated:
All individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy that objects
coming into their rightful ownership do not have electronic devices
attached to them, devices that would give law enforcement agents the
opportunity to monitor the location of the objects at all times and in
every place that the objects are taken, including inside private
residences and other areas where the right to be free from warrantless
governmental intrusion is unquestioned.
Id. at 1438. The Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation did not occur when
law enforcement installed the beeper because Karo’s privacy was not infringed simply by
receiving a container with a beeper in it. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
90
Id. at 709–10. A warrant was applied for, which resulted in several defendants’ arrests
for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. at 710. The agents also relied
on a visual observation of the residence on a cold and windy day when all of the windows
were left wide open, which led agents to believe the ether was being used inside. Id.
91
Id. at 714. The Court noted the beeper was the equivalent of a law enforcement agent
sneaking into the residence and verifying that the container was inside, and thus determined
that a warrant was necessary because this qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 715. In an unfortunate turn for Karo and his co-defendants, the Court was of the
opinion that even without the information illegally obtained by the beeper in the warrant
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the Court echoed the Knotts holding and stated the monitoring of the
vehicle while it traveled on public roads did not violate the Fourth
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion discussed the
Amendment.92
distinction between what is kept out of plain view and those things in
plain view, such as cars on public roads, which do not receive Fourth
Amendment protection.93 Only a few years later the Supreme Court again
had the opportunity to apply Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis to aerial surveillance.94
3.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine Does Not Provide
Protection from Aerial Surveillance that Takes Place from the Public
Airspace

In California v. Ciraolo, a law enforcement agent acting on suspicion
that Ciraolo was growing marijuana used a private plane to fly over his
residence.95 While flying at an altitude of 1000 feet, the law enforcement
agent was able to photograph and identify, with his naked eye, marijuana
plants growing in Ciraolo’s backyard.96 The Ninth Circuit Appellate

affidavit, there was still probable cause and thus the Court upheld the conviction of Karo.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 721.
92
Id. at 721; id. at 722 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 732 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Court correlated these facts to Knotts and determined, “the ether was seen being loaded into
[petitioner’s] truck, which then traveled the public highways—it is evident that under Knotts
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment as to anyone with or without standing to
complain about monitoring the beeper while it was located in [petitioner’s] truck.” Id. at 721.
93
Id. at 732–33 (Stevens J., dissenting). In support of his argument, Justice Stevens
reverberates the Knotts opinions by stating, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.” Karo, 468 U.S. at 732. However, Justice Stevens noted “concealment of personal
property from public view gives rise to Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 733. Once the
container went into Karo’s house it visually was not spotted again, and only the use of the
beeper allowed for law enforcement agents to track it leaving the residence in a vehicle. Id.
at 734. Justice Stevens continued, “[b]ecause the beeper enabled them to learn the location
of personal property not exposed to public view, it invaded an interest embraced in the
Fourth Amendment’s conception of a ‘search.’” Id. at 734–35.
94
See infra Part II.C.3 (summarizing and evaluating two cases involving aircrafts in
warrantless law enforcement investigations).
95
476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986). After receiving an anonymous tip, police attempted to
investigate but Ciraolo had two separate fences on his property, an outer fence that was six
feet high and an inner fence that was ten feet high. Id. The FBI relies on Ciraolo as authority
and precedent in justifying their current use of drones for domestic investigations. See
Musgrave, supra note 50 (finding Ciraolo endorses aerial surveillance and arguing that drones
are also permissible under the same standard).
96
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. Subsequently, the law enforcement agency was able to obtain a
warrant based on the anonymous tip, visual observations from the plane, and the
photographs. Id. at 213. Seventy-three marijuana plants were seized the following day when
the law enforcement agency executed the search warrant. Id. at 209–10.
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Court held Ciraolo had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was
violated by this aerial surveillance.97 The Supreme Court reversed this
holding, concluding society is not willing to recognize Ciraolo’s
expectation of privacy as reasonable.98 The Court determined the fences
Ciraolo employed only protected against street level views and his
backyard was constantly observable by anyone flying overhead.99
The application of the expectation of privacy analysis to aerial
surveillance was soon buttressed by another Supreme Court decision.100
Three years later, in Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court addressed law
enforcement’s use of a helicopter to observe a similar marijuana growing

97
California v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
The Appellate Court relied on the two fences that he had surrounding his property as
evidence that Ciraolo intended to maintain his backyard as private. Id. At the appellate
level, a significant part of the discussion revolved around the fact that this aerial surveillance
was not routine or general and was aimed at observing the residence of Ciraolo. Id. at 97–
98. The opinion stated:
From the perspective of defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
we deem it significant that the aerial surveillance of his back yard was
not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other legitimate law
enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the
specific purpose of observing this particular enclosure within
defendant's curtilage.
Id. at 97. In justifying this level of protection granted to an individual’s residence, the Court
relied on United States v. Allen, and stated, “a person need not construct an opaque bubble
over his or her land in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the
activities occurring there in all circumstances.” Id. at 98.
98
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214. No legal challenge was made regarding Ciraolo’s subjective
expectation of privacy. Id. at 211. With regards to the objective prong of Justice Harlan’s
expectation of privacy, Ciraolo believed that his efforts to block the street views from his
backyard is all that he “can reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain
the privacy of his garden.” Id. However, the Supreme Court believed that Ciraolo
knowingly exposed his backyard to observation by all aircrafts flying overhead. Id. at 214.
The Court stated, “[i]n an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is
routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of [1000]
feet.” Id. at 215. The FBI’s internal PowerPoint presentation strongly suggests that the
holding presented in Ciraolo is an endorsement for the use of domestic drone surveillance.
See Musgrave, supra note 50 (equating the Ciraolo opinion as an endorsement for domestic
drone usage and refusing to differentiate drones from traditional manned aircrafts).
99
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14. The Court was also not persuaded by the argument that the
flyover was intended to identify marijuana plants inside Ciraolo’s backyard and not just a
per chance sighting of the illegal marijuana growing operation. Id. at 213. In discussing this
concept of observations aimed at one specific individual, the Court stated, “[s]uch
observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant.” Id.
100
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1989) (detailing the application of the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to a similar aerial investigation, but involving a
helicopter rather than a plane).
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operation.101 Riley was growing marijuana in a greenhouse on his
property.102 After receiving an anonymous tip, a law enforcement officer
used a helicopter to fly overhead and observe marijuana plants through a
hole in the roof of the greenhouse.103 The officer flew over the greenhouse
at an altitude of 400 feet and was able to identify marijuana growing
inside.104 Echoing the Ciraolo analysis, the Court held that Riley did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when his greenhouse was readily
observable by anyone operating an aircraft in public airspace.105
101
Id. The Supreme Court of Florida held that Riley’s constitutional rights were violated
by law enforcement’s use of a helicopter under these circumstances. Florida v. Riley, 511 So.
2d 282, 289 (Fla. 1987), rev’d 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In doing so, the court held that the area
being observed was within the curtilage of Riley’s home. Id. at 286. The court determined
that Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated based on the intrusive nature of
helicopters and the location of the search that occurred. Id. at 289.
102
Riley, 488 U.S. at 447–48. Riley lived in a mobile home on five acres with a greenhouse
located on the premises. Id. at 448. Two sides of the greenhouse were not enclosed; however,
the view into these open sides was obstructed by foliage. Id. A wire fence with a “DO NOT
ENTER” sign surrounded the property. Id.
103
Id. The greenhouse roof was covered with several different types of panels and at the
time of the flyover approximately ten percent of the roof was uncovered. Id.
104
Riley, 488 U.S. 447–48. A warrant was obtained after these observations and Riley was
charged with possession of marijuana. Id. at 449. The Court refused to distinguish a plane
flying at 1000 feet, and the helicopter that was used in this case which flew at 400 feet. Id. at
451. The Court noted that helicopters and planes have different regulations for permissible
altitudes of operation. Id. at 451. One of the reasons behind this failure to differentiate was
that a helicopter operating at 400 feet is permissible by law and regulation. Id. Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion does not want to place such a heavy emphasis on the altitude
or legality of the altitude the aircraft operates. Id. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O’Connor believed that compliance with law and FAA regulations does not alone mean that
an individual’s expectation of privacy has not been violated. Riley, 488 U.S. 453. “The fact
that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any altitude or angle,
without violating FAA regulations, does not in itself mean that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation.” Id. at 454.
105
Id. at 450–51. The Court admitted that Riley did hurdle the Katz first prong of subjective
expectation of privacy by stating, “Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse
would not be open to public inspection.” Id. at 450. Addressing society’s finding of Riley’s
expectation of privacy, the Court stated, “the inspection was made from a helicopter, but as
is the case with fixed-wing planes, ‘private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public
airways is routine’ in this country, and there is no indication that such flights are unheard of
in Pasco County, Florida.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court infers that a Fourth Amendment
violation may have occurred had the helicopter’s flyover disturbed Riley’s use of his
property. Id. at 452. “As far as this record reveals, no intimate details connected with the
use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, and no wind,
dust, or threat of injury. In these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Riley, 488 U.S. at 452. The dissent believed that the plurality’s holding defeats
the underlying Fourth Amendment principle, the protection of people. Id. at 456 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun opined that the plurality focused on the legality of the
altitude the plane flew at, when instead they needed to consider whether low-level helicopter
surveillance over an enclosed backyard was consistent with the “aims of free and open
society.” Id. at 456–57. Succinctly summarizing his argument, Justice Blackmun continued,
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The Reemergence of the Trespass-based Approach

Very recently, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court once again
addressed when the Fourth Amendment is triggered in the context of a
warrantless search.106 Jones dealt with a law enforcement agency’s
warrantless attachment of a global positioning system (“GPS”) tracking
device to a vehicle operated by a cocaine dealer.107 The GPS device
“I agree of course, that ‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection[.] But I cannot agree that one ‘knowingly exposes [an area]
to the public’ solely because a helicopter may legally fly above it.” Id. at 457 (citation
omitted). See Hiltner, supra note 48, at 404–09, for an extensive discussion on the
intertwining of Ciraolo and Riley, as well as Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
234–35 (1986), which focuses on the application of aerial surveillance to the open fields
doctrine.
106
132 S. Ct. 945, 947–48 (2012). In 2001, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address
advanced surveillance technology in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). This case
involved a law enforcement agent who used a thermal scanner from a public avenue to
determine whether a home had an excessive amount of heat emanating from one wall,
signifying the growing of illegal marijuana. Id. The Supreme Court crafted a narrow
exception and said that Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the
government used this advanced technology. Id. at 34. The Court stated, “’intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,’ [c]onstitutes a search—at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. at 34 (citation omitted). It has been
suggested that drones fit under this exception if they are equipped with advanced
surveillance payloads. See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 14–15 (arguing that the type of
technology used on drones may ultimately decide the permissibility of the information
obtained); Schlag, supra note 36, at 16 (defining some of the technologies that are available as
not in general public use and thus finding these drones to be impermissible under the
standard set forth in Kyllo). However, many consider the general public use standard as
tricky to pin down, because under the Court’s holding the determination appears to be
whether or not it is available to the public. See Vacek, supra note 40, at 683 (critiquing the
inquiry as being whether or not the technology is available for purchase at Walmart). This
potentially complicates matters even more because technology that was once not in general
public use may eventually become popular and thus the standard is hard to apply. Id. Many
standard cameras that are available on drones are already considered to be in general public
use. Id. at 679–84. For purposes of this Note, the discussion is limited to drones that are
equipped with traditional surveillance cameras and the drones are operating similarly to that
of traditional aircrafts. See infra note 152 and accompany text (arguing that drones need to
operate in a similar fashion to the manned crafts in Riley and Ciraolo to be seen as
permissible).
107
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The law enforcement agency received a warrant to install a GPS
tracking device on this vehicle; however, it was limited to installation within the next ten
days and also must have been done in the District of Columbia. Id. When the device was
ultimately attached to the undercarriage of the vehicle the ten-day deadline had passed and
the attachment took place outside of the District of Columbia. Id. One scholar has suggested
that law enforcements’ advanced use of new technology has changed the perception of what
privacy can be expected. See Saby Ghoshray, Domestic Surveillance Via Drones: Through the
Lens of the Fourth Amendment, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 579, 587–88 (2013) (critiquing the amount
of latitude that law enforcement agencies get regarding the technology they are capable of
using).
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monitored all movements of the vehicle for a period of twenty-eight days
and relayed over 2000 pages of data.108 The district court denied Jones’s
motion to suppress the evidence based on the principle that while the car
traveled on public roads Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy.109
The Court of Appeals applied the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine, but held contrary to the lower court and stated the Fourth
Amendment was violated during the ongoing warrantless GPS
monitoring.110
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but took a surprise detour by
applying the trespass-based approach to determine the attachment of the
device to the vehicle created a search and thus violated the Fourth

108
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The GPS was able to establish the location of the vehicle at all
times within fifty to one hundred feet of its actual position. Id.
109
United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (2006). According to the lower court the
law enforcement agency does not need to obtain a warrant to place a tracking device on a
vehicle; however, any evidence that is obtained while the vehicle is not on public roads will
be suppressed. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) and United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983)). See United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467
(N.D.N.Y. 2005), for some discussion on the parallels between GPS devices and traditional
surveillance while addressing the use of GPS devices on public roads and the fact that law
enforcement could obtain all of the information by similarly conducting visual surveillance
on the vehicle. Moran’s vehicle was tracked over a two-day period by a GPS device. Id. The
New York District Court held that no violation occurred because all of the information could
have been obtained by visual observations and Moran had no reasonable expectation of
privacy while he travelled on public thoroughfares. Id. at 467–68.
110
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The opinion differentiated
the one time monitoring that took place in Knotts with the monitoring that happened on
Jones’s vehicle based on the amount of information relayed from the GPS device. Id. at 556.
The Court of Appeals believed that the amount of information transmitted by the GPS device
over a month was not exposed to the public for two reasons:
First, unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of
one's movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to
the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those
movements is effectively nil. Second, the whole of one's movements is
not exposed constructively even though each individual movement is
exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal
more—than does the sum of its parts.
Id. at 558. Regarding long-term warrantless monitoring, the court stated, “if such dragnettype law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.” Id. at 556 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84). See infra note 119 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion that appears to have
been persuaded by this theory). GPS technology has received some different treatment
across the country. See Hutchins, supra note 77, at 445 (providing some of the treatment that
GPS technology had gotten in state and federal courts). The author also points out that the
academic community is not at a consensus on how to treat this technology under existing
Fourth Amendment constraints. Id. at 452.
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Amendment.111 In justifying this holding, the opinion embraced the idea
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was added as additional
Fourth Amendment protection, but never replaced the trespass-based
approach.112 While all Justices agreed the Fourth Amendment was
violated, they did not all agree on the application of the trespass-based
approach.113
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion criticized the return of the trespassbased approach and accused the majority of applying “18th century tort
law” to resolve the issue of a modern surveillance technique in the Fourth
Amendment context.114 Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine, Justice Alito held the long-term GPS monitoring on public
thoroughfares was unreasonable.115 Justice Alito believed short-term
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). Quoting Kyllo v. United States, the Court
stated “we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” Id. at 950. The Court also relied on
cases involving seizures to help further the point that the trespass-based approach is still
alive and well. See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (stating Katz established that
“property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,” but did not
“snuff[] out the previously recognized protection for property.”); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969) (rejecting the contention that only the privacy of the individual is
considered under the Fourth Amendment and finding a violation occurred when a listening
device was placed in a home). But see Jones, 132 S. Ct at 960–61 (Alito, J., concurring)
(discussing Justice Alito’s critique of the plurality’s use of these seizure cases to reinvigorate
the trespass-based approach). Justice Alito believed Soldal and Alderman do not support the
propositions that the plurality contends. Id.
112
Id. at 952; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the [G]overnment
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain
information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). But see
supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s concurrence and his
disapproval of the return to the trespass-based approach). Justice Alito reiterates the postKatz phrase, “‘an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J., concurring).
113
Id. at 959. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, chastised the
pluralities application of the trespass-based approach. Id. at 957–58. For an in depth
discussion of the holding in United States v. Jones see Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and
Jones: The Implications of United States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV.
683, 700–01 (2013), describing the Jones case of little practical value because of the Justices’
refusal to come to a more sound agreement on why a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
114
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito presents some “particularly
vexing problems” that are associated with the return to this trespass-based approach. Id. at
962. Namely this new approach would provide no recovery for making electronic contact
with a vehicle and not physical contact. Id. Activation of a vehicle theft detection device on
a vehicle is one example of this electronic contact and tracking a cell-phone through the
installed GPS device is another. Id. Justice Alito argued that under the pluralities approach
this electronic touching would not likely be found to constitute a trespass. Id.
115
Id. at 964. A South Dakota Supreme Court case found a GPS tracking invalid under the
trespass-based approach soon after the Jones decision. South Dakota v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d
490, 496 (S.D. 2012). However, the South Dakota opinion went on to discuss the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine that Justice Alito urges. Id. at 497. The court held that the
111
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monitoring was reasonable, but argued tracking every movement of an
individual in a vehicle for a four-week span certainly passed beyond a
threshold, and as such, a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.116
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence similarly contended that long-term
monitoring of an individual traveling on public thoroughfares was
unconstitutional.117 Justice Sotomayor believed society has a reasonable
expectation of privacy when the sum of one’s movements are recorded
over a long period of time.118 In Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, the
government’s ability to ascertain vast amounts of information about the
individual creates grave Fourth Amendment concerns.119 The majority
opinion and the concurring opinions all seem to agree a violation of the
Fourth Amendment occurred; however, little was accomplished by the
decision because the opinions each take a different approach in reaching

GPS device that was used is capable of gaining such large amounts of information even if
only restricted to public roads that a warrant is required before it can be installed on a
vehicle. Id. at 498. One scholar believes that the emphasis should not be so rigidly based on
how the search occurred but the inquiry should instead focus on the outcome. See Ric
Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First
Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321–22 (2002) (presenting an outcome
determinative approach rather than unnecessarily analyzing the method of search).
116
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). As support for the argument the
concurrence noted that society’s expectation is based in part on the fact that law enforcement
agencies cannot and would not be able to secretly monitor and track every movement one
makes for an extensive period of time. Id. The opinion does not attempt to determine at
what point during the four-week surveillance operation the expectation of privacy was
violated but merely assert that the line was surely crossed. Id.
117
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Although Justice Sotomayor believed that the
government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s Jeep, as noted by the majority, provides for a
narrower grounds for the decision. Id.
118
Id. at 956. Some have described Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion as the broadest
reading of the Fourth Amendment. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42511, UNITED STATES V. JONES: GPS MONITORING, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY 9 (2012)
[hereinafter THOMPSON II GPS MONITORING] (evaluating Justice Sotomayor’s opinion which
acknowledges the existence of both existing Fourth Amendment doctrines). This report goes
on to discuss Justice Sotomayor’s concern about the viability of the third-party doctrine—the
principle that information voluntarily conveyed to third parties automatically surrenders an
objective expectation of privacy. Id. at 10.
119
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Through this type of monitoring the
government is able to ascertain political and religious beliefs as well as sexual habits. Id. at
956. A 2009 case out of New York similarly addressed these concerns. See New York v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (discussing a GPS tracking that took
place over an extended period of time). The GPS surveillance that took place in Weaver
involved sixty-five days of constant warrantless monitoring. Id. at 1195. Even worse is the
law enforcement agency did not even make it known as to why the monitoring took place in
the first place. Id. at 1196. Ultimately this New York court held this “massive invasion of
privacy” created a violation of New York State law and left the federal constitutional
question open for debate with regards to long-term GPS tracking of vehicles. Id. at 1201.
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such a conclusion.120 United States v. Jones leaves the Fourth Amendment
standing on uneasy ground and drone technology may be the catalyst for
a jurisprudential evolution.121
III. ANALYSIS
This Part of the Note analyzes and assesses the current state of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence regarding domestic drone surveillance
operations of individuals traveling on public thoroughfares.122 In recent
years, law enforcement agencies have turned to drones as a cost-effective
way to carry out their policing duties.123 The Fourth Amendment’s
purpose is to protect individuals from an overly intrusive government.124
Drone technology threatens the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment by intruding into an individual’s life and tracking every
movement while on a public thoroughfare.125 The covert nature of drone
120
See Gatewood, supra note 113, at 701 (describing the post-Jones Fourth Amendment
doctrine as an area that is in flux). The article goes on to discuss emerging technologies that
push the border of individuals’ privacy rights in today’s technological world, including an
in depth analysis of license plate readers. Id. at 702–04.
121
See Michael L. Snyder, Student Article, Katz-ing Up and (Not) Losing Place: Tracking the
Fourth Amendment Implications of United States v. Jones and Prolonged GPS Monitoring, 58 S.D.
L. REV. 158, 180 (2013) (arguing the Jones decision was unwise and the Supreme Court
avoided the real issue which was long-term warrantless surveillance); infra Part III
(discussing the lack of constitutional protection when drone surveillance is utilized in
investigations of vehicles traveling on public roads).
122
See infra Part III.A–C (analyzing the two different methods for determining when a
Fourth Amendment search violation has occurred and arguing the underlying principles of
the Amendment demonstrates why protection needs to be provided against drone
surveillance operations).
123
See HARRISON, supra note 51, at 4–5 (discussing the increased manufacturing of drones
that are capable of performing these surveillance missions); Musgrave, supra note 50
(presenting the FBI’s acknowledgement of drone usage as well as the internal PowerPoint
presentation that is given regarding domestic drone surveillance operations). This
presentation goes on to highlight the Bureau’s belief that the Supreme Court acknowledges
and allows the use of domestic drone usage for aerial surveillance. Id. This report makes
almost no attempt to differentiate between drones and other forms of aerial surveillance. Id.
“Domestically, state and local law enforcement entities represent the greatest potential users
of small UAS in the near term because they can offer a simple and cost effective solution for
airborne law enforcement activities.” GAO PRIVACY CONCERNS, supra note 46, at 11.
124
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (providing the text of the Fourth
Amendment and describing some of the original reasons for the codification of the
Amendment).
125
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 6–10 (arguing the legality of drone usage for domestic
surveillance operations potentially turning on where the drone is performing its operation).
The report states, “[w]hether a targeted individual is at home, in his backyard, in the public
square, or near a national border will play a large role in determining whether he is entitled
to privacy.” Id. at 12. The concurring Justices in United States v. Jones all argued that long
term tracking of an individual on a public thoroughfare was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment. See supra notes 115, 118 and accompanying text (arguing the reasonable
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surveillance creates an entirely new and dangerous method for the
government to ascertain information about the public.126 Traditional
methods of surveillance have been exceedingly more expensive and far
less effective at gathering the same amount of information.127 First, Part
III.A discusses the lack of application of the trespass-based approach to
drones.128 Next, Part III.B analyzes the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine concerning drones monitoring vehicles travelling on public
thoroughfares.129 Finally, Part III.C discusses the underlying goal of the
Fourth Amendment and how drone technology creates the potential for
incredibly intrusive and covert surveillance operations.130
A. The Trespass-based Approach Does Not Provide Protection from Long-Term
Drone Monitoring While on Public Thoroughfares
The recent United States v. Jones opinion muddied the Fourth
Amendment waters by reintroducing the trespass-based approach.131 The
expectation of Jones was violated when his movements were tracked for a period of twentyeight days while traveling on a public thoroughfare).
126
See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 41, at 1 (evaluating the dangerous ability of drones to
perform tasks that were once much more difficult). This report drafted by the ACLU
provides some suggestions to attempt to alleviate concerns regarding drone usage by
domestic law enforcement agencies. Id. at 15–16. Drone technology is capable of covertly
performing surveillance operations largely because of the abilities and equipment they can
be rigged with. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (referencing the size
differences, altitude capabilities, and some of the equipment that can be equipped). These
drones are capable of being equipped with a variety of different sensory equipment that
allow for surveillance operations at all times of the day and in all weather conditions. See
Schlag, supra note 36, at 7–8 (presenting the different visual equipment that can be used to
relay surveillance material from the drone to a person operating it on the ground).
127
See DOJ DRONE AUDIT, supra note 40, at 3 (presenting the staggering difference in cost
of drone surveillance as compared to traditional methods of aerial surveillance). The audit
represents drones as operating for $25 per hour compared to $650 per hour for traditional
surveillance. Id. See Vacek, supra note 40, at 676, for another example of the comparisons
that have been done proving the effectiveness of drones compared to traditional forms of
surveillance, such as the cost effectiveness of purchasing one specific drone as compared to
a manned helicopter. The staggering comparison shows that a law enforcement agency
could purchase more than three-dozen BAT-4 drones and it would still be cheaper than one
helicopter. Id. The operational costs of these drones are much lower than the helicopter as
well. Id.
128
See infra Part III.A (evaluating the lack of physical contact or a trespass that occurs by a
drone when monitoring an individual).
129
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine and
applying it to the drone context through corollary situations).
130
See infra Part III.C (evaluating the Fourth Amendment’s goal and arguing that drones
violate the Fourth Amendment when used for long-term surveillance operations of public
thoroughfares).
131
132 S. Ct. at 945, 959–60 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the majority opinion as unwise
and discussing the lack of recent precedential support for such a decision). The Jones decision
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reintroduction of the approach convoluted the issue by placing an
emphasis on the relatively minor trespass, disregarding the important
issue—the protection of people rather than places.132 The purpose of the
trespass-based approach was to prevent government intrusion from
private places, such as the home or office.133 This approach was once very
relevant; however, its day has come and gone.134 The original departure
from the trespass-based approach was in the mid-1960s when technology
made it possible to intrude without trespassing.135 The touchstone
has certainly received its fair share of criticism. See THOMPSON II GPS MONITORING, supra
note 118, at 12–13 (arguing the outcome of the Jones decision creates trouble for future cases
involving searches and technology). But see Gatewood, supra note 113, at 700–01 (discussing
the practical value of Jones or in a much more honest sense the lack thereof). Complications
arise when the principles set forth in Jones are applied to new technologies that are capable
of long-term monitoring without ever making physical contact with a vehicle. See Gatewood,
supra note 113, at 703–11 (presenting a number of new technologies that make electronic
contact with vehicles, but never actually come in physical contact with the vehicle).
132
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s application of a
traditional trespass doctrine as an outdated method for the technological age we live in);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (discussing the underlying principle of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of people and not places); Gatewood, supra note 113, at
701 (describing the application of the Jones decision as “in flux” and stating the difficulties
that are now presented in future cases involving electronic surveillance and tracking).
133
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the use of the detectaphone was not a Fourth
Amendment violation); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 106 (1967)
(holding that the use of wire-tapping was not a Fourth Amendment violation because no
physical intrusion of the home or curtilage occurred); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
282 (1983) (detailing the importance of having a proper showing before an officer can enter
into one’s home and invade the privacy of the resident); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J.,
concurring) (describing the home as a place where one can expect privacy however,
distinguishing the fact that things made plain and visible to the public do not deserve the
same protection); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (stating that one of the
central Fourth Amendment concerns is a police officer’s discretionary ability to rummage
through an individual’s belongings); Berger, 388 U.S. at 53 (evaluating the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment and safeguarding the privacy of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by the government).
134
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the impracticality of
applying the traditional trespass-based approach to modern examples). Justice Alito tried to
imagine an eighteenth-century equivalent to the GPS tracking that took place in Jones by
inquiring whether it is “possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the
movements of the coach's owner?” Id. The academic community has similarly found
difficulties in this approach. See Weaver, supra note 65, at 1138–49 (analyzing thoroughly
the once very relevant application of the trespass-based approach and its evolution prior the
more modern formulation); Snyder, supra note 121, at 180 (arguing return to the trespassbased approach was unwarranted).
135
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (requiring a different analysis to be done because “the
surveillance technique the[] [law enforcement agents] employed involved no physical
penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls”).
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requirement necessitating physical contact occurring before a Fourth
Amendment violation arises is outdated because drone technology can
monitor individuals without ever making physical contact.136
The drone technology available today is fully capable of tracking and
following a vehicle for an extended period of time without ever making
physical contact.137 The amount of information obtainable through this
monitoring is staggering and incredibly intrusive.138 Given that no
physical touching occurs during drone surveillance operations, there is no
remedy provided through the revitalized trespass-based approach.139
Since United States v. Jones, consideration must be given to both the
trespass-based approach, which provides no protection in the drone
context, and the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine.140

See supra notes 57, 61 and accompanying text (discussing the Olmstead and Goldman
opinions and relying on a physical intrusion to determine when a search has occurred during
a law enforcement investigation). One argument that the trespass-based approach is
outdated is relayed in Jones when Justice Alito argued that the application of the approach
was without valid justification because large amounts of technology that do not necessitate
a physical touching to track individuals. 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to
this non-physical touching as electronic contact). Justice Alito correlated a hypothetical
incident where a law enforcement agency activates a stolen car detection system that a
vehicle came manufactured with and argues that this electronic touching would not give rise
to a trespass-based Fourth Amendment claim. Id. Justice Alito went on to describe the
application of the trespass-based approach to GPS tracking as the equivalent of using “18thcentury tort law” to solve a “21st-centur[y] surveillance technique.” Id. at 957.
137
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 16 (discussing the ability and particularly unique nature of
drones and their ability to monitor an individual without ever making physical contact);
Takahashi, supra note 42, at 108 (providing drones are capable of performing the type of
surveillance activities that formerly required a trespass to occur). Several technological
features that are used on drones that allow for these surveillance operations include
“automated object detection, GPS surveillance, gigapixel cameras, and enhanced image
resolution.” Schlag, supra note 36, at 7.
138
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurrence) for an illustrative example of
how much information can be learned by tracking someone’s every movement over an
extended period of time and how in the aggregate a long term GPS monitoring operation’s
ability of the “Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” The tracking that took place over four weeks relayed over
2000 pages of data. Id. at 948. Drone technology allows for extensive periods of covert
surveillance that should be seen as impermissible. See Takahashi, supra note 42, at 110
(arguing that the amount of information obtainable unreasonably exceeds the amount of
government intrusion allowed by the Fourth Amendment).
139
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that a physical
touching takes place before the trespass-based approach can provide a remedy).
140
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. The Court stated that the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine has been added to the original trespass-based approach. Id; see Gatewood, supra
note 113, at 699 (describing the residual effect of Jones as creating “two doctrinal bases upon
which a defendant may challenge investigative techniques employed by law enforcement[,]
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the Jones newly formulated trespassory
test”).
136
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B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine Does Not Provide
Protection from Long-Term Drone Monitoring
The objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
has been used to make broad proclamations regarding areas where society
is unwilling to accept an individual’s expectation of privacy as
reasonable.141 The sum of two well established Fourth Amendment
principles, that have developed through the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine, create a gap that allows for long-term drone surveillance
operations on public thoroughfares.142 An underlying concept that helps
explain these two Fourth Amendment principles is that knowingly
exposing something to the public destroys an objective reasonable
expectation of privacy.143 First, Part III.B.1 addresses the first Fourth
Amendment principle, an objective lack of a reasonable expectation to be
free from aerial surveillance.144 Next, Part III.B.2 addresses the objective

141
See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz and the two pronged reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine). The first prong of
the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis includes a subjective element as to whether
the individual exhibited an expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The second prong of the analysis involves the determination
as to whether or not the individual’s expectation is viewed in light of societal norms as
something that would be considered reasonable. Id; see infra note 143 and accompanying text
(presenting some examples of areas that have been considered objectively reasonable
because the individuals made the information readily available to the public).
142
See infra Part III.B.1 (evaluating the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy relating
to aerial surveillance operations); infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy while traveling on public thoroughfares).
143
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (stating the principle rationale for
allowing warrantless beeper tracking in automobiles is that the beeper is merely a more
effective way to observe what is already being conveyed to the public); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
(“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(evaluating the lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle because of the vehicle and its
contents are in plain view while traveling on a public thoroughfare). This knowing exposure
to third parties of information has been used in other contexts to determine that parties do
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45
(1979) (holding no legitimate expectation of privacy when using a phone because the
information was voluntarily turned over to a third party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976) (holding that deposit information turned over to the banks does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment because of the bank’s third party status); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (discussing the lack of Fourth Amendment protection inside a hotel room
when the person whom was an undercover law enforcement agent was voluntarily invited
into the room). But see Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that a
person has a reasonable expectation that their luggage in public view on a bus will not be
physically manipulated in an exploratory manner to determine the contents inside).
144
See supra notes 99, 105 and accompanying text (discussing Ciraolo and Riley and the
holdings that lead to our current Fourth Amendment viewpoints with regard to this topic).
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lack of a reasonable expectation to be free from surveillance while
traveling on public thoroughfares.145
1.

No Objective Expectation of Privacy Exists with Regards to
Investigations Involving Aerial Surveillance

The Court in California v. Ciraolo identified that society will not respect
an individual’s expectation to be free from aerial surveillance.146 Aircrafts
travel through public airspace and, as such, courts consider this a vantage
point to visually inspect an individual’s property.147 Courts construe
viewing an individual’s property from public airspace as the equivalent
of an unobstructed view into the backyard from a street.148 Courts also are
not concerned with distinguishing between different types of aircrafts
involved in the law enforcement’s investigation.149 Arguably a drone will
receive the same latitude as other aerial surveillance methods.150 It seems
145
See supra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text (discussing Knotts and Karo regarding the
current state of Fourth Amendment with regards to vehicles traveling on public
thoroughfares).
146
476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986). The Court similarly found the same in Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S.
445, 451–52 (1989); see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–35 (1986)
(discussing the application of this principle to a large industrial complex inspected by the
Environmental Protection Agency). See McBride, supra note 41, at 646–51, for a discussion
of some limitations presented by Ciraolo, Riley, and Dow Chemical Co., while also
summarizing some distinctions that lower state courts have drawn since these opinions with
regards to aerial surveillance operations that became overly intrusive for differing reasons.
147
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (analyzing the fact that all of the observations happened
while traveling within the public airway). In Riley, this became a spotlight of the discussion
as the court addressed the flight of a helicopter at 400 feet. 488 U.S. at 451. The Court
ultimately determined that a helicopter flying at 400 feet is consistent with the FAA
standards and with the law regarding flying in navigable airways. Id. at 451–52. But see
Riley, 488 U.S. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing compliance with FAA standards
does not in itself determine that societal expectations have not been breached). Justice
O’Connor’s argument stems from the idea that the FAA has determined that there truly is
no lower limit for an altitude that a helicopter may fly. Id.
148
Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–50 (White, J., plurality). Justice White stated:
[T]he police, like the public, would have been free to inspect the
backyard garden from the street if their view had been unobstructed.
They were likewise free to inspect the yard from the vantage point of an
aircraft flying in the navigable airspace as this plane was. In an age
where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it
is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from
an altitude of 1,000 feet.
Id. at 449–50 (quotations omitted).
149
See id. at 451 (discussing the refusal of the Court to differentiate based on the fact that a
helicopter was used rather than a fixed-wing aircraft as was the case in Ciraolo).
150
See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the courts allowance of different
types of surveillance aircrafts). See supra note 87 and accompanying text for an argument as
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that the one distinguishing feature of drones—the lack of an on-board
pilot—will not provide a strong enough basis to distinguish drones from
other more traditional methods of aerial surveillance.151
A caveat to the court finding drones as permissible forms of aerial
surveillance is that it would procedurally need to follow methods
observed in California v. Ciraolo and its progeny.152 The court could
potentially differentiate a hypothetical drone case involving drone use at
high altitudes and equipped with advanced surveillance technologies.153
However, if the drone surveillance was to operate similar to a traditional
aircraft it is unlikely the courts would draw a distinction.154 The Supreme
Court has applied a similar principle in the context of vehicles traveling
on public thoroughfares.155
to why law enforcement agents will be able to use drone capabilities to aid in their
investigations. Knotts held “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276, 282.
151
See McBride, supra note 41, at 651–52 (discussing five distinguishing factors that not
having an on-board pilot presents). The five factors are: “(1) location of the observer, (2) use
of cameras to conduct surveillance, (3) ability to conduct continuous operations, (4) covert
rather than disruptive surveillance, and (5) restrictions on access to the national airspace
system.” Id.
152
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 16 (arguing drones would likely be permissible under
current law enforcement constraints so long as they operate in a similar manner to the
previous aerial surveillance cases); supra notes 97, 102 and accompany text (discussing the
holding in Ciraolo and Riley). The Court continually notes the observations made by the
agent as done with his “naked eye” as a way of equating this vantage point is the same as
the viewing from a public road. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448 (noting the importance of the visual
observation by the officer); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210 (stating the “naked eye” surveillance as
an important reason to find such an observation valid). The type of technology the drone is
equipped with will ultimately play a big role in how the Court treats drones. See THOMPSON,
supra note 36, at 14 (arguing the type of technology the drones are equipped with as an
important factor in determining the legality of aerial surveillance); McBride, supra note 41, at
651–54 (evaluating several factors that can potentially create a distinction from traditional
surveillance techniques).
153
See Hiltner, supra note 48, at 412 (discussing the surveillance being performed in Ciraolo
as being traditional in nature and emphasizing the need to be able to ascertain the
information with the “naked-eye”); Villasenor, supra note 33, at 492 (arguing that the “naked
eye” aspect of the observation was determinative); supra note 96 and accompanying text
(equating the surveillance that takes place from an aircraft as the equivalent of an
unobstructed view from public road). But see Villasenor, supra note 33, at 493 (discussing the
usage of advanced cameras in Dow Chemical Co.). The usage of advanced cameras, capable
of seeing much more than the “naked eye,” were still permissible in Dow Chemical Co.;
however, this case was factually different in that it involved the surveillance beyond just the
curtilage of the premises. Id.
154
See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
consideration of aerial surveillance methods and the approval of techniques that are similar
to that of other traditional surveillance techniques).
155
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the availability of long-term monitoring on public
thoroughfares).
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No Objective Expectation of Privacy Exists Regarding Vehicles
Traveling on Public Thoroughfares

The Fourth Amendment has given vehicles unique treatment based
on their transient nature and openness to the public.156 This treatment led
to several important decisions in the 1980s establishing the lack of an
expectation of privacy while traveling in a vehicle on public roads.157 This
principle has given free rein to law enforcement personnel to monitor
vehicles traveling on public thoroughfares for extensive periods of time
without a search occurring.158
156
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (evaluating the disparate treatment given
to vehicles as compared to homes and offices). The oft-quoted language explaining this
distinction:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). The Court in United States v. Knotts went on to
argue the protection of crime in and individual’s home as compared to a vehicle as:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home
is also of grave concern, not only to the individual, but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.
460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–
14 (1948)). See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984), for a comparison of the
distinct treatment given to vehicles as opposed to homes. In Karo, a case nearly identical to
the tracking involved in Knotts, the Supreme Court found the information the law
enforcement agents gained from a beeper monitor was impermissible. Id. at 716. The Court
determined that the activation of the beeper inside the home to determine the location of a
stash of chloroform constituted a search. Id. at 715. However, the Court found the tracking
and activation of the beeper while traveling in a vehicle on public thoroughfares as
permissible. Id. at 721.
157
See id. (holding the beeper tracking that took place valid only with regards to the
activation on public thoroughfares and not while it was used inside the residence of one of
the defendants); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (determining no reasonable expectation of privacy
in a vehicle while traveling on public thoroughfares).
158
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of law enforcement
agents to monitor an individual’s every movement while traveling on a public road because
the same information could potentially be gained from a traditional form of surveillance).
But see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2012) (refuting the
argument that the Knotts case in fact granted unlimited surveillance on public
thoroughfares). Pineda-Moreno argues that Knotts’ actual holding was “that you have no
expectation of privacy as against police who are conducting visual surveillance, albeit
‘augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancements as
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The GPS tracking in United States v. Jones was a great opportunity to
address some of the potential concerns of overly intrusive police
investigations; however, the Court avoided that issue by deciding the case
using the trespass-based approach.159 Although the concurring opinions
sought to address long-term tracking, the ultimate holding was of little
value.160 Surveillance of individuals traveling on public thoroughfares, as
envisioned by Knotts and Karo, should be seen as permissible to an
extent.161 However, the unrestricted long-term monitoring of individuals
traveling on public thoroughfares reveals a large amount of information
that, in the aggregate, should be considered private.162 Drone technology
science and technology afford[s] them.’” Id. at 1126. See also supra note 115 and
accompanying text (discussing a recent opinion that aims to curb GPS use by requiring a
warrant when these devices are used for extensive periods of time). This opinion held
“[w]hen the use of a GPS device enables police to gather a wealth of highly-detailed
information about an individual's life over an extended period of time, its use violates an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” South Dakota v.
Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 498 (S.D. 2012).
159
See THOMPSON II GPS MONITORING, supra note 118, at 9–10 (critiquing Jones because it’s
ability to apply to many advanced technology cases is nil); supra note 115 and accompanying
text (discussing the long-term monitoring and GPS use by the law enforcement agency to
track Jones over a period of twenty-eight days).
160
See supra notes 115, 118 and accompanying text (discussing the willingness of Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Alito to address the long-term tracking of an individual with GPS
technology). Justice Sotomayor broadly discusses this concept by stating, “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For a discussion concerning the lack of
practical value of Jones, see Gatewood, supra note 113, at 700–01. The author likens the
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones as the equivalent to waking up as a child on Christmas
morning only to find out that Santa forgot to bring you all of the things you wanted. Id. at
683.
161
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the willingness to find
relatively short-term monitoring as reasonable under the principles set forth in Knotts).
Shorter term monitoring should be seen as acceptable; however, the amount of information
obtainable through long-term monitoring violates the Fourth Amendment. See THOMPSON
II GPS MONITORING, supra note 118, at 7 (explaining the lack of information that is learned
by following an individual to a liquor store on one occasion compared to what the
government learns about that same individual if they follow him every day to the liquor
store for an extended period of time).
162
See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text (discussing the concurrence of Justice
Alito and Justice Sotomayor). Justice Alito argued that the monitoring that took place,
constant GPS tracking for twenty-eight days, did not comport with reasonable expectations
of privacy. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito states, “[w]e need not
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for
the line was surely crossed before the [four]–week mark. Other cases may present more
difficult questions.” Id. Justice Sotomayor discussed the law enforcement agencies ability to
ascertain important personal details about an individual’s lifestyle by long-term monitoring,
for example “their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id. at 956
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor broadly discussed this concept by stating, “it
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allows these long-term surveillance operations to take place for an
extended period of time without violating the Fourth Amendment
constraints currently in place.163 Part III.C will discuss how drone
surveillance technology defeats the underlying principle of the Fourth
Amendment.164
C.

Drone Technology is the Catalyst for Fourth Amendment Change

Drones can obliterate the constitutional protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.165 Law enforcement agencies have rarely been
restricted from using technological advances to aid in their duties.166
Although the judiciary has rarely handicapped law enforcement agencies
by placing blanket restrictions on the use of technology, since the
introduction of drones, legislatures have attempted to alleviate the
public’s concern of domestic drone usage through various pieces of
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” Id. at 957. See New York v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), for another example of the massive
amount of information obtained through GPS monitoring while also discussing some
potentially private places that may be disclosed by GPS monitoring, such as, “trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club,
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque,
synagogue or church, [and] the gay bar.”
163
See supra Part II.A (discussing the capabilities of drones that are being used in today’s
law enforcement operations); supra Part III.A (discussing the failure of the trespass-based
approach to drone investigations); supra Part III.B (discussing the failure of protection from
drone surveillance under the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine).
164
See infra Part III.C (discussing the flexibility and underlying principles supporting the
Fourth Amendment).
165
See DOJ DRONE AUDIT, supra note 40, at 3–4 (presenting the Department of Justices’
concerns about invasive and dangerous nature of the up and coming drone technology).
Privacy advocates such as the ACLU have similarly expressed harsh resistance to the
introduction of drones into regular police investigations. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note
41, at 11 (arguing the widespread use of drones creates a chilling effect on societal
expectations of privacy when individuals are outside of their homes).
166
See Simmons, supra note 115, at 1331–32 (arguing that technology that is well established
in society may create a change in expectations simply by understanding and knowing of the
technology’s existence); Weaver, supra note 65, at 1183 (discussing the erosion of societal
expectations based on innovative new technologies). At least one scholar argues that these
technological advances and the societal awareness of such technology have eroded the
public’s expectation of privacy. See Ghoshray, supra note 107, at 595 (arguing that privacy is
a fundamental right that has been weakened over time). Courts have never attempted to
prevent the use of new technologies by law enforcement agencies. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them”); supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing
the growing use of technology in law enforcement agencies to effectively perform their
duties).
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legislation.167 Unfortunately, these efforts have only been successfully
passed at the state level.168 Thus, currently law enforcement agencies are
able to arm themselves with drones because the increased production has
led to a wide variety of faster, cheaper, and more versatile drones than
ever before.169 Some contend drones are the next greatest tool to be used
in domestic surveillance.170 On the other hand, drone technology presents
a dangerous new era for surveillance operations, with implications that
can change the landscape of individuals’ privacy forever.171
167
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 19–20 (discussing a few of the state legislative efforts that
have been made and passed). This Article also addresses the wide range of legislation that
has been proposed at the state level with some states focusing on banning the arming of
drones and still other states are imposing a probable cause requirement in drone
investigations. Id. The flexible nature of the Fourth Amendment has often allowed for issues
of what constitutes a search to be determined by the judiciary rather than the legislature. See
infra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of using a judicial solution
rather than a legislative solution to curb domestic drone use and other advanced
technologies). But see THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 18–21 (exemplifying congressional
efforts that have been made during the 113th session attempting to regulate law
enforcement’s use of drones). This report mentions some legislative congressional successes,
which regulated Fourth Amendment privacy concerns pertaining to wiretapping, email
storage, bank records, and health records. Id. at 18.
168
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 36 (presenting
an interactive map which links to an exhaustive list of the states that have already passed
drone legislation and the ones that are attempting to pass drone legislation). By examining
the list of states and the different legislative efforts that exist, the true disparity can be seen
among how drone legislation should be handled. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21–213
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (prohibiting the use of drones for surveillance and evidence
gathering absent a warrant). The state of Virginia has placed a moratorium on drone usage
for a period of two years to determine the correct protocol to put in place for law
enforcement’s use of drones. See 2013 Va. Acts 755 (forbidding governmental agencies
involved in law enforcement activities from using drones before July 2015, at which point,
the discussion will be recommenced).
169
See Schlag, supra note 36, at 12 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment issues and describing
the increased effectiveness of drones as the reason for the exponential growth in the arena of
law enforcement usage). The increased effectiveness of drones has similarly been addressed
by several governmental reports. See DOJ DRONE AUDIT, supra note 40, at 3 (“[Drone]
technology improvements and their reduced costs have resulted in questions being raised
regarding the potential for routine law enforcement use of UAS and the implications of such
use on privacy rights.”); ELIAS, supra note 34, at 17–19 (arguing one of the biggest concerns
to the burgeoning drone market is the advanced equipment that can be loaded onto these
machines).
170
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 1 (evaluating the potential benefits of drone usage
and arguing that many governmental organizations are very excited about the potential this
new technology has). It is important to note the potential balancing that needs to be done
between effective law enforcement practices and potential privacy concerns that exist. Id; see
ELIAS, supra note 34, at 19 (countering the potential arguments against domestic drone use
by arguing the potential benefits that can be ascertained by domestically operating them).
171
See Ghoshray, supra note 107, at 590 (arguing drone surveillance operations are inimical
to the framer’s intentions and dangerous to civil liberties). One of the primary focuses of this
Article is how cultural events can create changes in societal expectations of privacy;
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The use of drone technology still must comport with the constitutional
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.172 However, as
analyzed above, the two Fourth Amendment frameworks fail to provide
protection from drone surveillance operations on public thoroughfares.173
The monitoring made capable through drones is of particular concern
because it provides the government with the ability to abuse drone
capabilities and directly infringe on a person’s Fourth Amendment right
to privacy.174 Essentially, the lack of protection afforded by Fourth

primarily focusing on the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Id. at 584. Dr. Ghoshray,
referring to drone surveillance, describes the United States as “sit[ting] at the precipice of an
impending governmental intrusion.” Id. at 590. This Article concludes with a chilling
warning that “[u]nless lawmakers and policy analysts are careful in developing the
appropriate framework, drones could end privacy for all.” Id. at 599.
172
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Katz and stating the underlying
principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”). Justice Alito addressed
the issue of compliance with Fourth Amendment reasonableness principles in Jones when he
applied the expectation of privacy doctrine to the GPS monitoring that took place. 132 S. Ct.
at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). Scholar Thomas Clancy, discussing Justice Brandeis’s
dissenting opinion in Olmstead, argued that the “Fourth Amendment must be construed to
afford protections against the dramatic increase in the ability of the government to intrude
based on advances in technology.” See Clancy II, supra note 57, at 51. In furthering this
argument, Clancy believes:
American colonists at the time of the framing focused on the techniques
used, those physical intrusions were offensive because they impinged
upon things held dear by those subjected to the searches, that is, their
persons, homes, and private papers. That normative-based view should
be applied to any intrusion with the purpose of obtaining physical
evidence or information, either by a technological device or the use of
the senses, into a protected interest.
Id. at 53–54. The ACLU similarly believes that drone technology needs to be reined in
because the potential for governmental abuse is too high. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note
41, at 1 (describing the potential for domestic law enforcement’s use of drone technology as
far too high and proposing different forms of regulation that attempt to inhibit drone usage).
173
See infra Part III.A–B (analyzing the trespass-based approach and the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine as it relates to drone surveillance on public thoroughfares
and concluding that both fail to provide Fourth Amendment protection).
174
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 13 (arguing that drone surveillance may ultimately
be curtailed based on the location that the drone is performing its surveillance). This report
similarly discussed Jones and the potential for long term tracking to be found impermissible
under some form of new standard that the Supreme Court may craft in the future. Id. at 9–
10. A similar governmental report presented concerns over the introduction to drones and
a need for cognizable standards to be applied to domestic law enforcement’s use of drone
technology. See DOJ DRONE AUDIT, supra note 40, at ii (arguing the FBI’s current standard,
which does not significantly differentiate drones from manned aircrafts, may lead to
difficulties based on drones’ ability to invade into the privacy of individuals). This audit
argued that substantial concerns still exist regarding surveillance operations and the
permissibility of drones to be used domestically for intelligence gathering operations. Id. at
3–4.
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Amendment precedent could quickly develop into a slippery slope.175
Scholars and advocates of privacy have been reluctant to introduce drones
into domestic surveillance operations because the use of drones is
dangerous and intrusive to civil liberties.176 Arguably, the long-term
drone monitoring operations place the United States one step closer to an
Orwellian society, where the privacy of individuals is no longer seen as a
fundamental right.177
The Fourth Amendment’s inherently flexible nature has been used
since its enactment to provide protection from an overly intrusive
government.178 A drone monitoring an individual’s every movement
175
See Takahashi, supra note 42, at 113 (“[T]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Takahashi
continued concerning this slippery slope:
The darkest hour is just before the dawn. Overzealous use of intrusive
technology by law enforcement will eventually force the Supreme Court
to reevaluate key cases such as Katz . . . in light of technological
advances. Until the Supreme Court weighs in definitively, advances in
miniaturized remote sensing technology will blur the boundaries
between reasonable observation and unreasonable eavesdropping.
Id. The ACLU is similarly concerned about the potential dangers that are on the horizon
concerning drone technology. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 41, at 12 (describing the
potential for institutional abuses by law enforcement agencies across the country). This
report augments this theory by discussing the abuses by the FBI and other security agencies
during the 1970s revolving around the civil-rights and anti-Vietnam era. Id. During this
time period, bad policies were put in place by these agencies, which led to systematic,
abusive, and illegal practices by entire governmental agencies. Id.
176
See GAO PRIVACY CONCERNS, supra note 46, at 32 (describing the concerns of several
different organizations including civil liberties groups and congress about the potential
privacy issues related to increased domestic drone surveillance); see also Ghoshray, supra note
107, at 599 (analyzing the potential for drones to change the societal privacy expectations of
individuals forever); Schlag supra note 36, at 12 (arguing that the small size and relative
ability to remain quiet creates a dangerous Fourth Amendment issue); Vacek, supra note 40,
at 675 (implying a new standard needs to be set for drone technology based on the amount
of information that can be obtained by a drone). Monmouth University’s poll of the public
on domestic drone surveillance similarly showed that individuals are concerned about the
potential for abuses by law enforcement agencies. MONMOUTH POLLING INSTITUTE, supra
note 52, at 1–3. However, the types of activities that the drones were used played a big role
in the level of support it received from the public. Id. For example, 42% generally were
concerned about their privacy if drones were to be used regularly by law enforcement
agencies; but 80% of people endorsed the usage of drones for search and rescue operations.
Id. Similarly, 67% of people regarded the usage of drones to issue speeding tickets as
improper. Id.
177
See ORWELL, supra note 1, 1–5 (presenting a frightening fictional dystopian society,
where no privacies remain for the citizens, and governmental intrusion into all aspects of life
are commonplace and accepted). The quintessential example of an overly intrusive
government was outlined in George Orwell’s classic work of fiction, 1984.
178
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (describing the transition from the
trespass-based approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to adjust for
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while traveling on public thoroughfares for an extended period of time
should undoubtedly violate the Fourth Amendment, although current
tests utilized by courts do not restrict such an excessive intrusion of one’s
Thus, this Note proposes modifying the reasonable
privacy.179
expectation of privacy doctrine, which will afford individuals protection
when the government uses drones to monitor public thoroughfares.180
IV. CONTRIBUTION
A problem arises when applying the two Fourth Amendment
doctrines to drone surveillance operations on public thoroughfares.181
First, drone surveillance technology provides the opportunity to monitor
without ever physically coming in contact with an individual’s vehicle.182
Second, the Fourth Amendment’s aim to protect individuals’ privacy from
an overly intrusive government is thwarted when massive amounts of
information can be learned through long-term monitoring of one’s
movements on public thoroughfares.183 This Part supplements the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine with an additional prong
during long-term drone surveillance operations on public
thoroughfares.184 This additional prong will allow courts to apply timeoriented guidelines to restrain long-term drone surveillance operations.
The trespass-based approach is wholly irrelevant to drone
surveillance because no physical contact takes place when a drone

advanced surveillance techniques); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the use of the two pronged test that provides for a case by case
analysis); id. at 362–63 (White, J., concurring) (discussing the “official surveillance of
petitioner's telephone conversations in a public booth must be subjected to the test of
reasonableness”). Some scholars have suggested that the holding in Jones showed the
willingness of the Court to potentially abandon or modify the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine in the future. See Takahashi, supra note 42, at 110 (arguing that the
underlying principle of Katz would remain regardless).
179
See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s concurrence and
his finding that a constant monitoring for a period of twenty-eight days violated the
reasonable expectation of privacy of the individual operating the car); supra note 119 and
accompanying text (discussing the amount of information that can be learned about an
individual when monitored for an extended period of time).
180
See infra Part IV (proposing the modern reasonable expectation of privacy analysis).
181
See supra Part III.A–B (analyzing the failure of the trespass-based approach and the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine as it applies to drone technology).
182
See supra Part II.A (presenting the technological capabilities of the drone technology
that is on the market today and also hypothesizing some of the potential future technologies
that will be available as the drone industry continues to expand).
183
See supra Part III.C (arguing the Fourth Amendment’s intention to protect individuals
from an overly intrusive government needs to be the fundamental concern when addressing
domestic drone surveillance operations).
184
See supra Part IV (proposing the modern privacy expectation doctrine).
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monitors an individual.185 This outdated method is not applicable to
many forms of advanced surveillance techniques that law enforcement
agencies now employ. Similarly, the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine does not provide a remedy against drone surveillance operations
on public thoroughfares.186 To succeed under the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine, an individual must be able to show “society is
prepared to recognize [their expectation] as reasonable.”187 The Supreme
Court has continuously stated society does not recognize an individual’s
expectation of privacy while traveling on public thoroughfares as
reasonable.188 However, in adopting this principle, the Supreme Court
was not considering dragnet covert surveillance methods, such as
drones.189 Law enforcement agencies’ current unfettered use of drones on
public thoroughfares needs to be reined in by a new standard.
This Note proposes a modern privacy expectation doctrine, which
would apply to drones, and will consider length as the primary element.190
The proposed doctrine will evaluate the span of days that a warrantless
drone surveillance investigation took place considered in light of two
factors to justify the longevity. The two factors are: (1) the potential
amount of information that can be gained; and (2) the underlying reason
that the surveillance operation began. The burden will rest on the law
enforcement agency to justify the length of the investigation in light of the
two factors. The doctrine will help to develop a body of case law that
allows for law enforcement agencies to understand the limitations of
drone surveillance before using drones as a means of investigation. The
modern privacy expectation doctrine attempts to protect the privacy of
individuals while still embracing flexibility.
The first factor of the modern privacy expectation doctrine will allow
courts to determine the amount of information potentially gained during
See supra Part III.A (presenting the capabilities of new drone technology and its ability
to perform long-term surveillance operations without ever physically touching the targeted
vehicle).
186
See supra Part III.B (determining that the current precedent as enumerated by the
Supreme Court still allows for long term warrantless monitoring of individuals so long as it
occurs while travelling on public thoroughfares).
187
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
188
See supra Part III.B.2 (evaluating two important automobile search cases that ultimately
led to this principle).
189
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983). Knotts contended that the Supreme
Court’s holding allowed for unlimited twenty-four hour surveillance of individuals on
public roads. Id. at 283. Justice Rehnquist retorted, “the reality hardly suggests abuse, [and]
if such dragnet type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be
time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.” Id. at 283–84 (citation omitted).
190
The author created the modern privacy expectation doctrine solely for the purposes of
this Note.
185
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the monitoring. This factor will ask how much information the law
enforcement agency may learn during the surveillance, rather than
inquiring into what the agency did learn. The potential information
acquired is the determinative factor. When a law enforcement agency
does not learn anything about an individual’s private life during a
constant four-week surveillance operation, a Fourth Amendment
violation is still likely to have occurred based on the potential to learn
intimate details of the monitored individual. This distinction is drawn to
prevent law enforcement agencies from engaging in dragnet-style
surveillance and instead force the agencies to tailor their operations to
potential crime-related activities.
The second factor of the modern privacy expectation doctrine will
allow courts to weigh the underlying alleged crime or reason why the
investigation began. Deference is given to crimes of a more serious nature.
Murder, rape, and drug trafficking are examples of the crimes that would
permissibly allow for longer surveillance operations. On the opposite end
of the spectrum, theft, driving under the influence, and public intoxication
would not justify long surveillance operations. This factor will place an
outer limit on the length of time for conducting an investigation, even in
cases involving the most heinous crimes, when the operation is not
tailored to protect the individual’s privacy. Justice Alito’s concurrence in
Jones determined twenty-eight days was certainly beyond the threshold of
permissible surveillance.191 Fourteen days seems like an appropriate outer
limit regarding the amount of time.192 This limit still allows for gathering
information without becoming exceedingly lengthy. The establishment of
precedent in this type of drone surveillance will be critical in the outcome.
Additionally, the second prong can create defined rules based on the type
of alleged crime being committed. For example, a complete ban of drone
surveillance could be placed on investigations surrounding
misdemeanors. Similarly, an exception to the fourteen-day period could
be created in the event of a national security emergency or domestic
terrorism threat.

See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s opinion about the
excessive nature of twenty-eight days of warrantless GPS tracking).
192
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito
made no effort to determine when the threshold was passed between short-term surveillance
and the period when it became an impermissible monitoring. Id. The fourteen-day period
selected for the modern privacy expectation doctrine was determined to be a middle ground
between short-term monitoring and the impermissibly excessive, as determined by Alito. Id.
191
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Some authorities have suggested that legislation is the solution to
domestic drone surveillance issues, rather than a judicial solution.193
While legislation has sometimes been the solution to Fourth Amendment
issues, more often than not, judicial restraint has been the answer.194 The
nuances involved in these Fourth Amendment cases require adaptability
that only the judiciary can provide.195 By avoiding rigid statutory
guidelines, this doctrine is capable of adapting and progressing with
drone technology, similar to the way the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine has adapted to changing technology over the last fifty years.196
By capping the amount of days that warrantless drone surveillance
operations may happen, law enforcement advocates may argue this
doctrine potentially handicaps these agencies and allows criminals to
potentially go free.197 However, the emphasis of the modern privacy
expectation doctrine allows for longer surveillance operations when the
alleged crime is potentially serious. Ultimately, this doctrine is capable of
balancing the serious concerns of law enforcement agencies with the
privacy concerns of the public.198
The modern privacy expectation doctrine is capable of protecting an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Its scope is aimed at restraining
long-term unrestricted monitoring with advanced drone technology of
individuals who are traveling on public thoroughfares. The amount of
information that a law enforcement agency can obtain from these longterm drone surveillance operations is intrusive and burdensome. The
protection of people’s privacy is paramount. The modern privacy
expectation doctrine refocuses the Fourth Amendment and alleviates the
concerns created by potential long-term drone surveillance.
The current Fourth Amendment doctrines do not provide a remedy
from long-term drone surveillance on public thoroughfares.199 While

193
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 18 (arguing that congressional legislation may be the
solution to domestic drone legislation); Ghoshray, supra note 107, at 599 (describing
lawmakers as the potential solution to protecting individuals privacy).
194
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 18 (presenting a few of the areas where Congress has
invoked legislative power to control Fourth Amendment issues). A few of these successful
legislative efforts include wiretapping, bank records, email storage, and health records. Id.
195
See supra note 178 and accompanying text (describing the inherent flexibility of the
Fourth Amendment and its ability to adapt to different cases).
196
See id. (describing the Fourth Amendment’s ability to change and adapt to technological
advances).
197
See supra note 167 and accompanying text (outlining the judiciary’s reliance to handicap
law enforcement agencies because of the important function they are serving).
198
See THOMPSON II, supra note 36, at 1 (summarizing the importance of the delicate balance
between law enforcement’s need to perform their duties and the public’s right to privacy).
199
See supra Part III (emphasizing the failure of the two current Fourth Amendment tests
in the context of domestic drone surveillance operations).
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some level of privacy is lost when traveling on public thoroughfares,
individuals do not expect to have all of their movements catalogued for
extensive periods of time.200 The modern privacy expectation doctrine still
allows for drone usage to investigate potential criminal activity but limits
the amount of time that such an operation can take place. This doctrine
merely respects an individual’s privacy and creates a reliable framework
for drone technology. A law enforcement agency will always be able to
seek a warrant at any point during their investigation and at such a time
a member of the judiciary will determine if the requisite probable cause
has been found to continue the drone surveillance operation. Advancing
technology should not diminish an individuals’ Fourth Amendment
The modern privacy expectation doctrine respects law
rights.201
enforcement’s use of advanced drone technology, but at the same time
restrains its use in an effort to guarantee the protections afforded to
individuals under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment needs to adapt to current surveillance
technologies law enforcement agencies are currently employing. Drone
technology is growing at a rapid pace and the Fourth Amendment needs
to evolve to prevent governmental intrusion into an individual’s privacy.
The modern privacy expectation doctrine restrains law enforcement
agencies from abusing this new and powerful drone technology.202 With
this new modern privacy expectation doctrine, an individual’s privacy is
given the utmost weight and the Fourth Amendment will continue to
protect an individual’s privacy.
The modern privacy expectation doctrine curbs the dragnet-style law
enforcement practices that drones are currently capable of performing. By
following this doctrine, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary will
have a set of standards to base their decisions on. The most important
aspect of the doctrine is to protect against long-term constant surveillance
by placing time constraints on the amount of time warrantless drone
operations take place. A law enforcement agency’s actions in tailoring the
investigation so as to not overly intrude into the individual’s privacy can
help to protect Fourth Amendment rights. Law enforcement will similarly
See THOMPSON II GPS MONITORING, supra note 118, at 7 (analyzing the public’s
awareness of potential short term monitoring by law enforcement agencies but instead
showing concerns about longer-term operations).
201
See supra Part III.C (arguing the Fourth Amendment’s intent does not get pushed aside
simply because new technologies allow for searches to occur in a different manner than
before).
202
See supra Part IV (presenting the modern privacy expectation doctrine and the ability of
it to curb law enforcement’s long-term domestic drone operations).
200
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be allowed to investigate potential crimes of some magnitude for longer
periods of time. This doctrine will be able to develop into a wealth of case
law that provides even more insight into when a warrantless drone
surveillance operation must terminate. Most importantly, this doctrine
only attempts to hinder warrantless drone usage—at any point during an
investigation a law enforcement agency may apply for a warrant and
receive judicial authorization in full compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.
Now back to the drone surveillance investigation involving Tom.203
The law enforcement agency began the operation because of contact that
Tom had with his brother, who is involved in manufacturing illegal drugs.
After extensively monitoring Tom for thirty-five days, the law
enforcement agency applies for an arrest warrant. The law enforcement
agency charges Tom with conspiracy to manufacture and sell illegal
drugs, even though it does not believe it has much of a case. It justifies
the arrest warrant on the grounds Tom constantly travels to his brother’s
residence at all hours of the day.
Under the modern privacy expectation doctrine, Tom’s attorney could
argue the monitoring was completely impermissible and that the evidence
to justify the arrest warrant was illegally obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The investigation was in no way tailored to protect
Tom’s privacy. The drone surveillance was performed for too long a
period of time and allowed the government to ascertain an enormous
amount of personal information without receiving or even applying for a
warrant. In the end, the modern privacy expectation doctrine protects
Tom’s right to privacy.
Shane Crotty*

See supra Part I (introducing Tom and the warrantless surveillance operation that was
used to gather evidence and place him under arrest based on evidence obtained from a longterm drone monitoring on public thoroughfares).
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